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I. INTRODUCTION 
…It is our duty before God and all persons to clearly state and warn today: 
in the language of justice and international law every thought of taking 
Kosovo and Metohija by force would mean that, under the eyes of the 
entire world in the twenty-first century, a democratic country in the middle 
of Europe would have part of its territory taken by force, which is also 
considered to be its spiritual cradle. And no matter how well this might be 
covered up, this act of forcible taking away would have the essential 
character of occupation…Only by agreement can a compromise and a just 
solution be achieved…The state of Serbia must be prepared in this process 
to ensure true and substantial autonomy for Kosovo and Metohija, and for 
all people and nations that live there. 
          –Serbian Patriarch Pavle, 4 November 2005 
A. PURPOSE OF STUDY 
In the aftermath of ethnic cleansing in the Balkan region in the 1990s and the 
subsequent NATO armed interventions, the Serbs have strived to overcome their 
nationalist legacy and work towards new goals of integration into the greater Euro-
Atlantic community institutions, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) and the European Union (EU).  Certain issues, however, must be resolved 
before Serbia can engage in further negotiations with such institutions, including 
Kosovo’s final status and turning over war criminals.  Second only to the war criminal 
issue, Kosovo is the main stumbling block preventing the Serbian government from 
moving forward in tackling other pressing issues, such as corruption and unemployment.2  
NATO and the EU require its aspirants to institute internal institutional changes to meet 
pluralistic democratic standards and transparency prior to even being considered 
candidates.  While the Serbian government has met many of the demands imposed upon 
it, there is a lingering question amongst Western policy makers whether Serbian civil 
society is robust enough to meet the demands of a pluralistic democracy.  Indeed, the 
Serbian reaction to Kosovo’s final status is but one of the many litmus tests for the West 
 
2 Interview with Dr Roy Stafford, professor at National Defense University, 13 December 2005. 
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to assess the Serbian society’s readiness to access its institutions.3  One of the actors 
which could influence the reaction to tests like Kosovo’s final status – positively or not – 
is the Serbian Orthodox Church, which has grown in its societal and political sway since 
Milošević left power in 2000 and is currently the most trusted institution in Serbian 
society.4 
This thesis analyzes the Serbian Orthodox Church's place in post-Milošević 
Serbian society.  Specifically, the thesis explores the nature of the influence the Church 
sways within Serbia's on-going transformation into a liberal democracy.  The study does 
this by analyzing the Serbian Orthodox Church’s role in Serbian history, politics and 
society.5  It examines the nature of the Church’s influence and evaluates the implications 
of this influence (or non-influence).  For policy makers seeking a peaceful resolution of 
Kosovo’s status and integration of Serbia into Europe, it is even more important to 
understand the extent and nature of the Church’s current influence in Serbian politics.  
The common perception in the West is that the Church is a monolithic organization, 
which promotes rabid nationalism, and that therefore its influence should be 
marginalized.  The West has maintained this image since 1989, when Church officials 
appeared next to Slobodan Milošević at the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo 
celebrations; in Western eyes, the two were paired from that point forward.  This thesis 
evaluates whether this perception of the Church is accurate.  If the image is accurate, then 
the possibilities for the Serbian Orthodox Church to exert a positive influence on Serbian 
society and politics are limited.  If the image is inaccurate, however, then pluralism 
within the Serbian Orthodox Church could allow openings for a pluralist society to 
 
3 The Kosovo issue is a volatile one in Serbia right now and needs to be handled with sensitivity, 
especially as the Radical Party (extreme nationalists) has increased its popularity in the last few elections, 
currently hovering at about thirty percent favorability in opinion polls (far ahead of the eleven percent 
sustained by the Serbian president’s centrist and pro-European party).  Should Kosovo gain independence, 
the Radical Party could very well come into power.  See Igor Jovanovic, “Serbia fights to hold on to 
Kosovo, Montenegro,” International Relations and Security Network (ISN) Security Watch, 27 November 
2005, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=13641 (accessed 23 January 2006). 
4 According to a poll conducted the Centre for Political Research and Public Opinion of the Belgrade 
Social Sciences Institute for the European Movement in Serbia in January 2005, “a total of 71.2 per cent of 
citizens [have] a positive opinion of the church. Only 6 per cent of respondents expressed complete distrust 
of the church.”  See “Majority of Serbs Still Distrusts Hague Tribunal - Opinion Poll,” BBC Monitoring 
International Reports (originally released by Radio B92 text web site, Belgrade), 5 January 2005.  
Available from LexisNexis. 
5 The Serbian Orthodox Church has been a keeper of Serbian religious heritage, and in essence, of 
Serbian identity throughout the centuries. 
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develop.  For instance, when Milošević came to power, there were some within the 
Serbian Orthodox Church who thought the time had come for the Church to take its 
rightful place within the state.  Most in the Church hierarchy were nonetheless quickly 
disillusioned with Milošević and denounced him fairly early in his reign.6  Understanding 
the nature of the Serbian Orthodox Church’s actual influence today will help Western 
policy makers gauge the importance of its potential contributions to the Kosovo 
discussions, as well as reconciling other facets of Serbia’s past so as to move towards the 
future, which for Serbia means belonging to the European Union and NATO. 
 
B. SUMMARY OF CURRENT LITERATURE AND VOCABULARY 
New democratic societies, especially those emerging from the communist 
experience, have more challenges than those who have been established for several 
decades or centuries.  Central and Southeastern European countries, with the exception of 
Czechoslovakia, did not have stable, lengthy experiences with democracy prior to the 
communist era.  These countries have thus been expected to develop democratic 
societies, institutions and traditions practically from scratch in a short amount of time.  In 
contrast, Western European countries and the United States have had many more years to 
overcome their democratic growing pains.  However, the growth experience does not 
need to be agonizing.  There are factors which have emerged from the experiences of 
more mature democracies which can contribute to the successful establishment and 
consolidation of new democracies. 
One of the more important factors contributing to the consolidation of democratic 
rule is the development of a robust civil society.  Civil society can act as a way to 
enhance institutional legitimacy among the people of a country; it can serve as a base for 
developing acceptance of democratic values and can assist the society to deflect such 
negative forces as extreme nationalism.  Of course, civil society is not always positive 
and can be detrimental to minorities who can be excluded.  The theories which address 
civil society and its associated tools are examined next, followed by a review of the 
different kinds of nationalism and certain exclusive behavior such as collective rights. 
 
6 See Chapter III, which discusses these denunciations in detail.  Also, despite this distancing, the West 
has not disassociated the Serbian Orthodox Church from its alleged endorsement of extreme nationalism. 
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1. Civil Society, Social Capital and Networks 
Civil society, a society’s state-independent actors, can play a key role in 
establishing a strong democracy.  This is the viewpoint of the associational or the 
Tocquevillean school of thought.7  Tocqueville thought that society required “self-
governing associations” to strike a balance between the “powerful state…[and the] 
tyranny of the majority.”8  An adherent of this school, Larry Diamond, argues that civil 
society advances democracy by: increasing “tolerance and compromise;” reducing 
conflict; increasing government oversight; and increased communication.9 
Another advocate for the importance of civil society emerged from a 1996 
conference entitled “The Rise of Civil Society in the 21st Century,” which established 
core values to create a strong civil society.  One of these values was cultural, in which 
“all the diverse elements of society are worthy of value and respect,” such that a person 
should not necessarily “merge into some sort of homogenous mass;” rather, this heritage 
should enrich the society.10  The conference participants recognized that this type of 
pluralism was ideal but that the absence of this pluralism produced “ethnic cleansing and 
its dehumanizing corollaries [which] run totally counter to civilized functioning.”11 
Most political theorists do recognize a strong civil society is not necessarily 
always a good thing.  There are instances where a strong civil society can have negative 
effects (see Section 2, on extreme nationalism).  However, there are some who would go 
further, claiming that adhesion to ethnic and/or religious identity is not compatible with 
civic society.  For example, Ernest Gellner claims that “modularity [“the ability to rise 
beyond traditional or ascriptive occupations and associations”]…makes civil society.”12  
 
7 Other schools include the post-Marxist or Hegelian School (historical conflict), the Regime or 
Lockean School (social contract, natural law) and the Neo-liberal School or Paine (anti-statist, pro-market).  
See Goran Hyden, “Building Civil Society at the Turn of the Millennium,” in Beyond Prince and 
Merchant: Citizen Participation and the Rise of Civil Society, ed. John Burbidge (New York and Brussels: 
Institute of Cultural Affairs International, July 1997), 20-21. 
8 Ibid., 20. 
9 Ibid., 22-23. 
10 John Epps, “Core Values of Civil Society,” in Beyond Prince and Merchant: Citizen Participation 
and the Rise of Civil Society, ed. John Burbidge (New York and Brussels: Institute of Cultural Affairs 
International, July 1997), 279-280. 
11 Ibid., 280-281. 
12 Ashutosh Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 2002), 41. 
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Gellner further claims that civil society “is not only modern but also based on strictly 
voluntary, not ethnic or religious, associations between the family and the state.”13  
Ashutosh Varshney tempers these arguments, stating that “taking pride in one’s ethnic 
group and working for the group does not, ipso facto, make one ‘uncivil.’”14 
One way to create a positive civil society is to develop inclusive social capital.  
Social capital includes the combination of social ties, trust and cooperation between sets 
of people.15  Political theorists argue that social capital is created by associations, 
providing an additional explanation for why civic associations impact the quality of 
democracy.  Robert Putnam and Kristin Goss identify three different aspects of social 
capital: first, social capital can develop in a formal (labor unions) or informal (lunch 
buddies) organization; second, social capital can be construed as thin (saying hello to a 
stranger) or thick (interacting with your family); third, social capital can be inward-
looking (men’s only club) or outward-looking (Red Cross).16 
Just as there can be negative civil societies, social capital can also be negative and 
not helpful for democratic development and social cohesion.  Indeed, the effects of social 
capital on social cohesion will differ depending on whether the groups link across various 
social cleavages, or whether they build sub-groups into tighter groups.17  Social capital 
can thus exert positive effects if there is some kind of “bridging” with diverse ethnic and 
religious factions.  If civil society creates extreme “bonding” or excessive exclusionary 
ties, the resulting negative civil society can be detrimental to those considered outside the 
norm.18  It is a question of finding the proper balance between the two kinds of behavior 
since, as Putnam states, “bonding without bridging equals Bosnia.”19 
 
13 Varshney, 42. 
14 Ibid., 43. 
15 The term ‘social capital’ first evolved in the early 1900s, when L. Judson Hanifan “concluded that 
the grave social, economic, and political problems of the communities in which he worked could be solved 
only by strengthening the networks of solidarity among their citizens.”  See Robert D. Putnam and Kristin 
A. Goss, introduction to Democracies in Flux: the Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary Society, ed. 
Robert D. Putnam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 4. 
16 Ibid., 9-11. 
17 Ibid., 8, 11. 
18 Ibid., 8-9, 11. 
19 Ibid., 11-12. 
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Pippa Norris outlines two claims of Putnam’s social capital theory which are 
pertinent to this study.20  First, horizontal networks are important since,  
organizations in civic society such as unions, churches, and community 
groups…[bridge] social cleavages, bringing together people from diverse 
backgrounds and values, and promoting ‘habits of the heart’ such as 
tolerance, cooperation, and reciprocity, thereby contributing to a dense, 
rich, and vibrant social infrastructure.21 
These horizontal networks can thus contribute to the building of higher social trust within 
society, which could translate into positive social capital.  Secondly, Putnam claims that 
social capital leads to “important consequences for democracy” since social capital 
increases the legitimacy of the democratic institutions.22 
Norris asserts that Putnam’s claims above must be qualified.  First, she found that 
social trust was more important than associations in determining the link of social capital 
and socioeconomic development, social tolerance or political involvement.23  Second, she 
states that this trust “appears to be rooted in…particular cultural histories” (low social 
trust equals low social capital).24  This kind of low social trust has been evident in 
societies like Serbia, which have experienced not only communism but also the after-
effects of the wars in the 1990s.  Third, Putnam and Goss’ claims assume inclusive social 
capital and a positive civil society.  Other theorists have simply rejected Putnam and 
Goss’ claims that social capital and trust are vital ingredients for democracy (see note 
below).25  Nevertheless, there is mounting evidence that membership in such institutions 
 
20 A third claim asserts “Social capital has declined in postwar America.”  See Pippa Norris, 
Democratic Phoenix (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002): 140. 
21 Ibid., 138-139. 
22 Ibid., 139-140. 
23 Ibid., 155-161. 
24 Ibid., 167. 
25 Kenneth Newton questions the pro-social capital camp’s assertion “that social trust and political 
trust are different sides of the same coin.”  He claims that they “are not necessarily related.”  He does not 
totally discount the role of trust but states that “social and political trust are related to different sets of 
social, economic, and political variables,” in which “political distrust is not caused so much by social or 
economic factors, but by political ones.”  He states that social trust (created mostly through education and 
income level) does not necessarily influence political trust but that political elements can assist “to sustain 
social capital.”  He is mostly alluding to older democracies since he goes on to list under political trust in 
early democracies a “great reliance on social, economic, and ideological ties to underpin trust.” See 
Kenneth Newton, “Social and Political Trust in Established Democracies” in Critical Citizens, ed. Pippa 
Norris (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 172-174, 179-186. 
7 
like religions and unions does have an impact on civic engagement in other areas such as 
electoral turnout and protest activism; this role has been fulfilled by other forces in post-
industrial and secularized societies.26 
In addition to inclusive social capital, strong associational networks can build up a 
positive civil society.  Varshney, in describing Hindu and Muslim strife in India, 
proposed that there are two kinds of networks, associational and quotidian, which can be 
helpful in strengthening bonds between communities.  Associational networks consist of 
organized ties between groups, including both professional and non-professional 
associations, while quotidian networks are informal, the “simple routine interactions of 
life.”27  Varshney claims that both can “promote peace” but that their absence “opens up 
space for communal violence.”28  Associational engagement, which is considered “a 
sturdier bulwark of peace,” is developed through such common interests as business.29  
These networks, like bridging and bonding, can be inter- or intra-communal, the latter 
being potentially detrimental to building up a positive civil society. 
These kinds of networks can be extended to religions and ethnic groups.  Granted, 
religious associations may not always reproduce the same positive, bridging effects of 
other associational networks but they can enrich the building of civic networks.  For 
example, the Catholic Church in Poland is often quoted as a model in that country’s 
struggle and subsequent transition to democracy – this group acted to increase 
responsible citizenship.30  Varshney counters the claim that “…religion is equal to 
traditionalism and therefore can’t perform the functions of civic organizations” since this 
claim “has too many exceptions to be considered empirically admissible.”31  These kinds 
of associations only work towards peace if they are involved in “intercommunal 
engagement” (bridging) and not solely in “intracommunal engagement” (bonding).32  As 
for quotidian intercommunal networks, they can only be developed if groups are not 
                                                 
26 Norris, Democratic Phoenix, 187. 
27 Varshney, 3. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., 9-10. 
30 Ibid., 42-43. 
31 Ibid., 43. 
32 Ibid., 46. 
totally segregated – people need to have the opportunity to encounter each other if there 
is to be any engagement.33  Both the association and quotidian networks can assist 
society since “organized civic networks, when intercommunal…withstand the exogenous 
communal shocks – partitions, civil wars, desecration of holy places.”34  Associational 
networks are better able to withstand greater shocks than quotidian networks which might 
fall apart due to smaller shocks.  Each type of network is nevertheless better suited for 
peace than if the “engagement is only intraethnic” since in these cases “small tremors” 
like a football victory “can unleash torrents of violence.”35 















Figure 2.    "Communal Violence and Peace" Replicated from Varshney, 12 
 
These theories regarding civil society and some of its tools, social capital and 
networks suggest that developing an inclusive, intercommunal society will assist 
developing democracies to withstand shocks such as extreme nationalism or to resist 
temptations like excessive collective rights. 
2. Nationalism and Collective Rights 
Not all forms of social capital are positive, and some can be challenges to 
democracies.  Foremost is the issue of nationalism, when found in an extreme form.  
 
33 Varshney, 9-10. 
34 Ibid., 10. 
35 Ibid., 11-12. 
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e, religion, shared historical experience, 
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political and the national unit should be congruent.”36  Benedict Anderson expands the 
definition to be “an imagined political community – and …it is imagined because the 
members…will never know most of their fellow-members…yet in the minds of each 
lives the image of their communion.”37  Within this bonded community there exists a 
“deep, horizontal comradeship” which will lead to people “willing to die for such limited 
imaginings.”38  Furthermore, theorists argue that nationalism has a political agenda 
because this imagining also locates the nation as sovereign, whose people think they 
“should rule themselves in a political system that expresses and protects those distinctive 
[cultural, historical] characteristics.”39  By nature, then, nationalism seems to be bonding, 
rather than bridging. 
Nationalism n
tion between different types of nationalism: counterrevolutionary, revolutionary, 
ethnic, and civic.40  Each of these types of nationalism has a different effect on social 
capital; the last two are of interest to this study.  Civic nationalism is based “on loyalty to 
a set of political ideas and institutions that are perceived as just and effective.” 41  Civic 
nationalism thus tends to create bridges across ethnic groups – positive social capital.  An 
example would be the United States and the American Dream – no matter what one’s 
background may be, if one works hard enough, one will have the chance to succeed.  In 
contrast, ethnic nationalism is based  
on common culture, languag
and/or the myth of shared kinship, and…use[s] these criteria including or 
exclude members from the national group.”42   
nationalism thus tends to drive groups further a
 
36 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1983), 1. 
37 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 
2d ed. (rev) (London and New York: Verso, 1991), 6. 
38 Ibid., 7. 
39 Jack L. Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2000), 23. 
40 Ibid., 38-39. 
41 Ibid., 24. 
42 Ibid. 
10 
ose elites who “need to 
harness
acy? describes the “doctrine of collective rights” which claims 
that 
one’s own group is entitled to set the rules for members of other groups to follow 
within a certain territory, or to assert territorial autonomy within specified 
boundaries…it is…the claim to superiority and to an entitlement to rule or…the 
demand that the group be granted autonomy and provided with state-funded 
cultural institutions.49 
                                                
Societies just starting on their democratization path are most vulnerable to the 
effects of ethnic nationalism.  Democracy opens up the door to th
 popular energies to the tasks of war and economic development” without giving 
up power.43  New democracies are vulnerable to ethnic nationalism “when 
democratization begins in a setting where the basic building blocks of political or 
administrative institutions have never been laid down.”44  On the other hand, civic 
nationalism develops when “elites are not particularly threatened by democraticization” 
since the institutions required to run the democracy “are already well established before 
the mass of the population gains political power.”45  The ideal situation for a 
democratizing state would thus be to first instill the values of civic nationalism and to 
avoid any collective rights based on ethnicity.46  These steps might be counterproductive 
if there are already “entrenched institutions, ideas, and interests based on invidious ethnic 
distinctions.”47  Finally, Snyder cautions that “weak democratic institutions often make 
society uncivil” – that even if democratic elements exist, these might be used for negative 
and even violent ends.48 
There is another kind of exclusive behavior akin to extreme nationalism.  Sabrina 
Ramet in Whose Democr
One’s own group has certain rights that are superior to those of others…and that 
 
43 Snyder, 32. 
44 Ibid., 38. 
 
1.   
met, Whose Democracy?  Nationalism, Religion, and the Doctrine of Collective Rights 
in P rn Europe (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1997), 6. 
45 Ibid., 38-39.
46 Ibid.,  
47 Ibid., 40-41. 
48 Ibid., 4







of universal rights, fits well with civic nationalism, rather than ethnic nationalism. 
thodox 
Church have been historically bonding in nature.  Indeed, Milošević’s decade-long 
nationalist reign still casts a shadow over the neophyte Serbian democracy.  Snyder 
ntai  was “an intensely exclusionary nationalism,” 
developed in the early 19th century “institu
s groups adhering to this doctrine seek to transform “cultural differences into 
l divisions” which can be religious and/or political in nature (e.g., creationism, 
l language).50  Ramet proposes instead “societal rights” which include “respect for 
rests of the entire body politic.”51  The idea of “societal rights,” with its concept 
 
C. THE SERBIAN EXPERIENCE 
The preceding theories about issues like civil society and nationalism can be 
related to the Serbian experience.  Both Serbian nationalism and the Serbian Or
mai ns that Serbian ethnic nationalism
tional vacuum” created by the departure of the 
Ottoman Empire.  The new government imported ideas of nationalism from the West and 
appropriated “cultural themes to lend legitimacy to the task of building a wholly new 
state.”52  These themes included teaching school children the myths of the past and the 
definition of Serb nationhood.  Intellectuals initiated the spreading of nationalistic ideas, 
borrowing elements of religion at times to create their national myths (i.e., Heavenly 
Serbia), with the government using populism and the myths to subsequently gain 
momentum for their own interests.53  The Serb leadership seemed to follow a similar 
pattern in the post-Communist 1990s.54  Another possible barrier to democratic 
development includes Donald Horowitz’s claim that ethnic cleavages found in countries 
like Serbia have retarded democratic efforts, as opposed to Poland, which has a more or  
 
 
                                                 
50 Sabrina P. Ramet, Whose Democracy?, 9.  Emphasis original. 
51 Ibid., 7. 
52 Snyder, 38, 170, 182. 
53 Ibid., 172, 179. 
54 Ibid., 180. 
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old of nationalism. 
Civic networks in the Balkans have been extremely vulnerable to shocks. 
me the dire economic and politic situation of the late 1980s, leaving 
the peo
 more conducive to successful democratic political change than 
others 
less homogenous society.55  The challenge for Serbia today is to break free of these 
ethnic nationalist molds of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and acquire the civic 
m
Varshney argues that communism virtually wiped out intercommunal civic networks in 
Serbia and “robbed [Serbs] of their civic role.”56  Since the networks were so weakened, 
they could not overco
ple susceptible to Milošević’s agenda.  Another vulnerability to exogenous shocks 
also came from the Serbian Orthodox Church’s religious bonding tendencies and the 
resulting influence on society.  Historically, the Serbian Orthodox Church has seemed 
exclusive of others, viewing itself as a social, political and cultural force, entitled to a 
proper place in society, akin to the collective rights doctrine.57  The Serbian Orthodox 
Church has indeed made strides in reasserting itself in the public sphere, particularly 
since 2000.58  It has also envisioned itself as a representative of all Serbs, even for those 
outside of Serbia proper. 
There are some academics who have claimed that Orthodoxy and democracy are 
thus not compatible because of Orthodoxy’s alleged inflexibility.  One detractor is 
Samuel Huntington, who argued societies with a Catholic or Protestant background “are, 
or historically have been,
(Orthodoxy, Islam).”59  However, this claim of incompatibility with democracy 
was also claimed of Catholics in the United States even as late as the 1960s when John F. 
Kennedy was running for president.  Another pessimist regarding Orthodoxy is Max 
                                                 
55 Donald L. Horowitz, “Democracy in Divided Societies” in Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and 
Democracy, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University 
Press, 1994), 36. 
been successful in convincing the Serbian government to pass favorable legislation 
and t hurch’s behalf.  For example, the Serbian military used a helicopter to transport a 
Serb ters in 
Mon
56 Varshney, 298. 
57 This view has partially stemmed from the “one church, one people, one emperor” doctrine. 
58 The Church has 
aking action on the C
ian Orthodox chapel onto Montenegrin property in 2005.  For more see “Churches and Helicop
tenegro: Politics by Other Means,” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty Reports 9, no 23 (12 August 
2005), http://www.rferl.org/reports/balkan-report/2005/08/23-120805.asp (accessed 23 January 2006). 
59 John Anderson, Religions Liberty in Transitional Societies: The Politics of Religion (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 15.  Original Source: Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: 
Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993), 72-85. 
13 
r human progress and fulfilment.67   
One cannot superimpose the Western model of democracy onto Serbia since factors like 
the Serbian Orthodox Church, which has formed an identity based on the “fusion and 
      
Weber, who claimed that it suffers from its “caesaropapist” structure.60  However, many 
contest these kinds of claims.  Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan assert that “Orthodox 
Christianity is [not] an inherently antidemocratic force.”61  Linz and Stepan claim that if 
the government is democratic, Orthodox Christianity will support it but if the government 
is “antidemocratic, the democratic opposition in civil society will not normally receive 
substantial or effective support from a national Orthodox church.”62  Elizabeth 
Prodromou has also contested Huntington and Weber, stating that “there is ample 
empirical evidence to suggest that Orthodox Christianity and democracy are generally 
compatible.”63  However, Prodromou acknowledges that when it comes to “key elements 
of the pluralism that characterizes democratic regimes,” Orthodoxy is rather 
ambivalent.64  This ambivalence stems from different sources, such as “little experience 
with life amid democratic pluralism,” experiences of vulnerability as a minority in 
different empires, and elements within the religion (such as emphasis on unity).65  The 
experience of living in pluralist societies has actually increased the amount of internal 
pluralism within the various Orthodox churches, which has further contributed to the 
Orthodox ambivalence towards societal pluralism.66  Political analyst Christos Mylonas 
further states that  
orthodoxy and democracy share common notional references in the 
prescriptive emphasis on co-operation, responsibility, participation and the 
potential fo
                                           
60 Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation (Bal
The John Hopkins University Press, 1996), 453. 
timore: 
eth Prodromou, “The Ambivalent Orthodox,” Journal of Democracy 15, no. 2 (April 2004): 
62. om Project Muse. 
ove and harmony leads to skepticism about pluralism as the protection 
of d and the primacy of unfettered competition.”  See Ibid., 66-67. 
n Eternal Identity (Budapest 
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cause” could “circumscribe the consolidation of democracy…[based on the] claim that it 
nce - does it seek to build 
ridges across societal sectors or does it seek to exclude others by bonding together an 
 of the Church and its faithful?  Is it united in its 
approach to define and subsequently im
fronts, this influence has been mitigated by its internal 
pluralism, and to a certain extent, Serbia’s democratic institutions.  The Serbian Orthodox 
Church has thus not been monolithic in its approach towards other communities, though 
bon ll 
ation of Serbianhood.”68  Furthermore, Mylonas asserts that the Se
ment, through its use of Serbian Orthodox symbols of a “sacred and transce
alone is capable of maintaining the peace among its population.”69  Of note, the Church 
being involved in politics for the sake of politics “would be doctrinally unsustainable and 
socially dismissed.”70  While Orthodoxy may be compatible with democracy, its role 
within Orthodox countries is not necessarily compatible with the Western liberal 
democratic model (e.g., separation of church and state).71 
 
D. QUESTIONS FOR STUDY 
Given the previous theories regarding Serbia, Orthodoxy, civil society and 
nationalism, how do these apply to the Serbian Orthodox Church, after the fall of 
Milošević in 2000?  What is the nature of the Church's influe
b
autonomous societal group, consisting
plement its goals?  Does the Serbian Orthodox 
Church depend on the state for its political mandate, or is it the one shaping the political 
picture?  Finally, what are the implications of this behavior for Serbia's integration into 
Euro-Atlantic institutions?   
This study will demonstrate the multifaceted nature of the Serbian Orthodox 
Church in its behavior toward other communities and the internal pluralism it has 
experienced in various issues.  Additionally, though it has increased its influence over the 
political and civil society 
ding behavior prevails.  This bonding behavior partially arises from the fact that a
                                                 
68 Mylonas, 132. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid., 133. 
71 One might point to the Greeks as the cradle of democracy and model for Western democracies but 
these proto-democracies died out long before the Greeks were absorbed into the Roman Empire and 
subsequently adopted Christianity. 
15 
religion
 and bridging 
behavior, but this is done for the sake of clarity.  Second, this study has limited access to 
thor’s inability to access native language 
docum
s exhibit some form of exclusiveness or they would not be a separate religion.  
The issue to monitor is if these bonding tendencies become an obstacle to building a 
positive civil society.  At this point, it is unclear if the bridging foundations laid in the 
last few years will effectively counterbalance some of the more negative bonding 
tendencies within the Serbian Orthodox Church.  It is nevertheless imperative that the 
Church not be excluded from future developments within civil society due to the great 
respect held for the Church by the Serbian people within Serbian society.72 
 
E. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
This study uses a blend of case studies, histiography, and textual analysis to 
evaluate the nature of the Serbian Orthodox Church’s bonding and bridging influences as 
an actor within civil society.  First, each chapter will be divided into bonding and 
bridging sections, followed by an analysis of the subject church’s influence.  This is an 
artificial division, since one member of the clergy can exhibit both bonding
measures of influence, due primarily to the au
entation.  As such, several proxies will be used to measure the influence of the 
Serbian Orthodox Church in Chapters III and IV and the other churches examined in 
Chapter II.  These proxies include level of trust in the church as an institution, as well as 
rise of membership within the church.  Some direct measurements will include the level 
and kind of state funding the church has received and what kind of legislation has been 
passed to benefit the majority church and/or to exclude other churches.73  Third, this 
study relies on several different kinds of sources, though primarily on secondary.  These 
secondary sources include those found in academia and media (especially for the more 
current issues).  The media does include extensive translated media sources from the 
Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS, now the Open Source Center) and 
                                                 
72 The Serbian Orthodox Church (listed as SPC) had 22 percent vote of confidence as opposed to the 
he EU (5 percent).  It should be noted that about 20 percent of those Republic president (11 percent) and t
polled did not trust any institution.  See “Institucija od Najvećeg Poverenja u Srbiji Decembra 2004,” 
Center for Political Studies and Public Opinion Research: Institute of Social Sciences (Belgrade, 
December 2004), http://www.cpijm.org.yu/srpska/scpijmdn.htm (accessed 28 August 2005). 
73 A majority church is the church which has the most members within a given nation – in Se
case, the Serbian Orthodox Church. 
rbia’s 
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bia’s neighbor and adversary in the twentieth century, Roman Catholicism 
has trad
LexisNexis.  Primary sources include translated church documents as well as e-mail 
correspondence and face-to-face interviews with numerous academic and military 
experts, religious figures and even a Serbian politician.  These sources are not necessarily 
quoted in the study but did provide much appreciated vectors, insights, information and 
feedback.   
Chapter II commences the study with two case studies, that of Croatia and Russia.  
This analysis will examine the nature of the influence of the majority churches in the 
subject countries.  Each case will examine if the majority churches were monolithic or 
pluralistic in their influence (was it simply bonding/bridging or a mixture of both?).  In 
Croatia, Ser
itionally played a major role in national identity, though this has been problematic 
due to a large minority population (mostly Serbs).  Additionally, the Roman Catholic 
Church in Croatia has played a more ambivalent role in shaping society than in countries 
like Poland.  Russia, Serbia’s co-religionist and historical partner, is too religiously 
diverse as a country for the Russian Orthodox Church to totally dominate society, but it 
has attempted to position itself as the shaper of Russian society.  After these comparative 
case studies, Chapter III will address the questions at hand by examining unresolved 
issues stemming from historical events, including the issues of Kosovo’s final status and 
the handing over of war criminals to The Hague.  The snapshots will reveal what kind of 
influence the Serbian Orthodox Church exhibited during these periods of trial and 
tribulation.  Chapter IV will then explore the Serbian Orthodox Church and its role in 
civil society in the post-Milošević era, as Serbia attempts to transition into a liberal 
democracy.  This chapter will demonstrate that despite the Serbian Orthodox Church’s 
increased role within society, it still engages in a mix of bonding and bridging behavior.  
Finally, the conclusion will offer an assessment of the impact of the nature of the Serbian 
Orthodox Church’s influence and implications for the Euro-Atlantic institutions, which 






ihil obstat – nothing stands in the way…the words are employed to 
uggest that, with the collapse of the communist power monopoly 
throughout what used to be called the Soviet East European region, 
literally nothing stands in the way of new religious movements, groups, 
and associations, including many previously illegal.74 
Religions in post-communist societies have had varied experiences as their 
countries emerge from decades of repression.  Still, they have one thing in common – 
they have desired to become (or in some cases remain) prominent actors within the public 
sphere.  The case studies will argue that both throughout history and in the modern era, 
the main churches in Croatia (Roman Catholic) and Russia (Orthodox) have not been 
monolithic in their bonding or bridging behavior, though each have exhibited bonding 
tendencies towards ethnic groups affiliated with other denominations.  To understand the 
context of each church’s influence, this analysis will begin with an overview of 
Catholicism’s and Orthodoxy’s respective roles writ large throughout history.  Next, each 
case will examine the nature of the influence of the country’s primary religion in the 
public sphere, in history and today. 
 
B. THE ROLES OF CATHOLICISM AND ORTHODOXY 
1. Catholicism 
Due to their unique historical heritage, Western European religions have very 
different internal structures and roles in the public sphere than their counterparts in the 
East.  First, when the western half of the Roman Empire disintegrated towards the end of 
the fifth century, the Catholic Church was the only institution left intact.  The Church 
quickly went from being the spiritual leader of the newly Christianized empire to also 
being its secular administrator.  As a result, “churchmen provided the lawyers and clerks 
on whom the lay rulers depended…[which] tended to give the Roman Church a legal 
                                                
II. RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE: CASE 




74 Sabrina P. Ramet, Nihil Obstat: Religion, Politics, and Social Change in East-Central Europe and 
Russia (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 1998), 3. Emphasis original. 
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outlook.”75  he urch 
became increasingly a ho was “the 
guardian not only of the Faith but of the traditions of Roman civilization.”76  Eventually, 
ecame a political force in its own right.  By the time 
secular te the 
Catholi
d its 
autonomy.  While the secular powers gained more of an upper hand with the Catholic 
Church as tim
As t  barbarian invasions mounted, the power in the Catholic Ch
symmetrical in favor of the Bishop of Rome, w
under this bishop, the Church b
 forces organized enough to create empires, the rulers had to accommoda
c pope.77 
The Catholic Church was also financially independent, which helpe
e passed, there were still instances in which the pope was able to make 
emperors literally beg for forgiveness.78  Even after the Protestant Reformation, the 
Catholic Church was able to insert itself in the domestic affairs of states.  It intervened 
between local Catholics and their rulers (Catholic or not) in negotiating the local 
Catholics’ status in the state, which bore “all the characteristics of a treaty between one 
power and another.”79  The pope did not necessarily take sides with the local Catholics 
since he “was more inclined to look for an amicable solution.”80  The universal authority 
also extended to the public sphere, as the Catholic Church was often the shaper of civil 
society and moral authority.81  Though it had a universal outlook and was able to bridge 
across many different ethnic groups to bring them under one faith, the Catholic Church 
                                                 
75 Steve Runciman, The Great Church in Captivity: A Study of the Patriarchate of Constantinople 
from the Eve of the Turkish Conquest to the Greek War of Independence  (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1968), 6. 
76 Ib
77 T  of Charlemagne in 800, when the Holy Roman Emperor was 
ordained
Church. 
autonomy vis-à-vis the pope; however, all recognize the pope’s authority and the basic tenets of the 
Catholic Church.  See Colin B. Donovan, “Catholic Rites and Churches,” Eternal Word Television Network 
Glob
id., 8. 
his was evident in the crowning
 by the Catholic pope – thereby drawing at least part of his secular legitimacy from the Catholic 
 See Hendrik Spruyt, The Sovereign State and its Competitors (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1994), 43-44. 
78 The Catholic Church was able to successfully raise money throughout Western Europe – “no area of 
Christian Europe escaped the extractive capability of the church.” See Ibid., 45-51. 
79 Some would claim that the Reformation actually launched the centralization of papal power.  See 
René Rémond, Religion and Society in Modern Europe (Oxford and Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell 
Publishers, Inc., 1999), 28-29. 
80 Ibid., 28. 
81 This is not to imply that the Catholic Church has always been monolithic.  Even today there over 
twenty different rites and churches which identify with the Catholic faith, each with various degrees of 
al Catholic Network, (n.d.), http://www.ewtn.com/expert/answers/catholic_rites_and_churches.htm 
(accessed 12 April 2006). 
19 




Church to subjugate all rulers to the pope were frowned upon by the Orthodox Church 
sinc re’s 
asingly legalistic in 
ids 
any exact pronouncements on doctrine.  By not pronouncing definite doctrine, the 
Ort of 
ult, 
has nevertheless exhibited bonding behavior toward those of other faiths.  The actions 
conducted in the name of a singular faith have had dark implications for many non-
Catholics, from the victims of the Spanish Inquisition to the victims of multiple pogroms. 
This exclusionary behavior has been moderated in recent decades.  There 
nevertheless remain growing pains in developing this new approach, as seen in the 
Croatian case.  T
d the doctrine of the Catholic Church regarding other faiths.  No longer were other 
faiths to be automatically condemned, but rather they were to be respected.  This change 
of heart widened the Catholic Church’s universal religious outlook (all are called to be 
saved) to giving priority to building bridges with non-Catholics, without direct 
proselytizing aims. 
2. Orthodoxy 
The Orthodox Church followed a very different path than its sister church (the 
Catholic Church), even before the Great Schism of 1054.  First, the eastern half of the 
Roman Empire stayed strong for many years after the implosion of the western half.  
Unlike in the West where the Catholic Church came to dominate the secular realm, in the 
East, secular authority remained firmly in place – leaving no room for the Orthodox 
Church to assert itself independently.  In the East, therefore, the Orthodox Church 
ame a quasi-state actor and in some later cases, a full-fledged state actor.  T
Emperor in the East was the Orthodox Church’s head; the political efforts of the C
e it believed that secular power only belonged to the emperor and not to the Empi
church.82 
The theological outlook also shaped the Orthodox Church position within society 
and its internal structure.  Whereas the Catholic Church became incre
its outlook, the Orthodox Church remained apophatic, embracing a tradition that avo
hodox Church hesitated to advocate “religion [as] a complete guide for the conduct 
life” which reduced much of its potential moral authority over the masses, and as a res
                                                 
82 Runciman, 7. 
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Eastern
h hierarchy from shaping secular life.85 
tate interdependence and horizontal hierarchy led to the 
establis
ss, lend an element of universality to Orthodoxy and has acted to unify 
Orthod
it “could never exercise the same moral influence as the hierarchy in the West.”83  The 
apophatic outlook also extended to the internal Orthodox Church structure: the 
Ecumenical Patriarch did not have as nearly much sway over other Orthodox churches in 
 cities as the pope did in the West.  This was due to the fact that hierarchy in the 
Orthodox Church is much more horizontal than in the Catholic Church.  All Orthodox 
patriarchs are technically equal: Orthodox Church hierarchies and spheres of influence 
have traditionally been circumscribed within specific countries.84  This meant there has 
been little overarching structure that governs the Churches across national boundaries.  
Furthermore, the emphasis on mysticism has led to the filling of higher positions within 
the Church with monks, including that of the patriarch, which has further disassociated 
the Orthodox Churc
The structure of church-s
hment of autocephalous (independent) churches, tied to individual countries.  
Though the basic theological dogmas remained similar, these churches have tended to 
bond religiously as well as ethnically, each maintaining the old “one church, one people, 
one emperor” norm from Byzantine times.  The Catholic Church, because of its 
independence from individual state structures and vertical hierarchy, not only had the 
potential to unite a community of Catholics across national boundaries, but also avoided 
the exclusive association of the Church with a particular nationality or ethnic group – all 
can become Catholic, regardless of their ethnic background.  Within each national 
Orthodox Church, in contrast, there has been no incentive to bring in other ethnic or 
national groups under their national church.  The Ecumenical Patriarch does, 
neverthele
ox Churches within the last few decades.86  Due to the decentralized nature of 
Orthodoxy, however, these actions are conducted via moral influence rather than 
ecclesiastical authority as the pope has in Rome.  In any case, the tendency to tie national 
identity to a national Orthodox Church exists to this day, as seen in the case of Russia. 
                                                 
83 Runciman, 6-7. 
84 Ibid., 8-9. 
85 Ibid., 28. 
86 “Brief Historical Note Regarding the Ecumenical Patriarchate,” Ecumenical Patriarchate website 
(n.d atr.gr/patrdisplay.php?lang=en&id=5.), http://www.ec-p  (accessed 12 April 2006). 
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C. CROATIA 
The universal Catholic Church has long influenced Croatian society.87  It was not 
until the nineteenth century when nationalist influences clamored for a specific Croatian 
Catholic identity that the Vatican allowed more native Croatians to occupy positions 
within the Croatian Catholic hierarchy.88  Previous attempts to create a unique Croatian 
Catholic identity had been discouraged and many times denied by the Vatican.89  Since 
the establishment of a more distinct Croatian identity, the Catholic Church in Croatia has 
exerted mixed influences over civil society, as captured by the events in World War II, 
the communist era, the 1990s and today.  Each historical juncture will be examined for 
evidence of bonding and bridging influences. 
1. Bonding 
World War II continues to be a sore subject within the Balkan region.  Many 
claim the Catholic Church in Croatia was a full collaborator with the Ustaša (Nazi-
affiliated regime).90  These fascists adopted some Catholic symbols as part of their 
paraphernalia, thereby linking the movement to the Catholic Church.  They also 
mandated forced conversions to Catholicism, sometimes to the point of death.91  The 
Ustaša regime also went out of its way to kill Jews, Roma and Serbian Orthodox.  Serbs 
suffered the most, with the US Holocaust Museum estimating between “330,000 and 
390,000 [Serbs were killed], with 45,000 to 52,000 Serbs murdered in Jasenovac” (the 
                                                 
87 Croatians first started converting to Catholicism in the seventh century but the faith became 
mainstream after the Croatian ruler converted in 800.  See Marcus Tanner, Croatia: A Nation Forged in 
War (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1997), 6-7. 
88 Vjekoslav Perica, Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), 10. 
89 One major sticking point was the use of the Glagolitic script, which is akin to Cyrillic.  After several 
centuries of restricting use of the script, Pope Innocent IV finally eased the limitations in 1248, allowing 
use of the vernacular, a privilege not accorded to other Catholic churches until Vatican II.  Nevertheless, 
this division within the Catholic Church in Croatia, coupled with outside interventions by the Vatican, has 
been claimed as a key factor in weakening the early Croatian state.  Later, when the Croatian state was sp
 including the Hapsburgs, Venitians and the Ottomans, some Catholi
lit 
between the great powers of the day, c 
cler y sought a pan-Slavic solution to re-establish Croatia, even reaching out to the 
‘ene .  See Tanner, 10-12, 44-45. 
 came back to haunt the Croatians during the 1991-1995 conflict as their Serb minority 
join  the Yugoslav army to commit atrocities in the name of avenging past wrongs, including 
the s
gy in Croatia actuall
my’ – the Orthodox
90 This history
ed forces with
helling of Vukovar and Dubrovnik. 
91 Tanner, 151. 
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tration camp).92  While only a minority of priests and bishops 
embrac
 and would weaken the Catholic Church in 
Croatia ian clergy also suspected the Vatican would force the Catholic 
Church
     
infamous Ustaša concen
ed the Ustaša cause from start to finish, it was enough to cause a split within the 
Catholic Church in Croatia. 
The communist experience also divided the Catholic Church.  A few clergy 
within the Catholic Church remained a thorn in the Yugoslav government’s side, even 
after relations with the state improved after the 1960s.  These clergy promoted bonding of 
their religious compatriots, championing the rights of their believers (to be treated 
equally as non-believers) and rejecting Marxism.93  When Pope John XXIII initiated 
Vatican II, several Croatian clergy were wary of the sweeping reforms, afraid that these 
reforms would be exploited by the communists
.94  Certain Croat
 in Croatia to accept rulings to suit the Vatican’s agenda.95  The moderating trends 
in Croatia dictated by Vatican II were reversed after the events of the Croatian Spring 
(nationalist revival) in 1971, when the traditionalist clergy re-emerged and successfully 
pushed the Church back to the traditional (non-ecumenical) ways.96  These actions 
included influencing the society through such actions as Marian devotions and 
canonization of Croatian saints; religiosity (those professing to be religious) among 
Croatian Catholics also soared during this time of nationalist fervor.97  The Yugoslav 
government tried to squash this spirit of defiance by cracking down on the Catholic 
                                            
92 US Holocaust Museum, “Holocaust Era in Croatia: Jasenovac 1941-1945,” (Washington, D.C.: 
n.d.), http://www.ushmm.org/museum/exhibit/online/jasenovac//history/print.html (accessed 25 February
2006). 
 
nity under Stress, vol. 2, ed. Pedro Ramet (Durham and London: Duke 
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93 Pedro Ramet, “The Catholic Church in Yugoslavia, 1945-1989,” in Catholicism and Politics in 
Communist Societies Christia
ersity Press, 1990), 192-196. 
94 The Croatian clergy were even more suspicious of their fellow Yugoslavs, the Serbian Orthodox 
clergy, who also attended the Vatican II discussions based on Yugoslav government’s hope this 
participation would encourage ecumenism between the two churches (and an easing of societal tensions 
between ethnic groups).  This plan failed due to each side’s suspicions.  See Klaus Buchenau, “What Went 
Wrong?  Church-State Relations in Socialist Yugoslavia,” Nationalities Papers 33, no 4 (December 2005): 
553, 557. 
95 “The Holy See made compromises that the church inside the country swallowed unwillingly.”  See 
ibid., 553. 
96 Ibid., 558. 
97 Perica, 58-59.
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percent of its faithful identifying themselves as religious (as 
polled 
pushback as late as 2003 from both lower level clergy and lay people.  In the words of 
one lay person, who had lost her two young boys to the war in the 1990s: “The priest and 
      
Church.98  The Catholic Church in Croatia nevertheless remained strong, with 62 percent 
of its members proclaiming themselves as religious, as opposed to the Serbian Orthodox 
Church, which only had 26 
in 1985).99 
The Croatian break from the Yugoslav federation is a third example which 
reflected divisions within the Catholic Church in Croatia.  When General Tudjman came 
to power in 1990, there were those in the Catholic Church hierarchy who were 
undoubtedly pleased.  After all, Tudjman was a bona fide nationalist as a survivor of the 
communist purges that followed the Croatian Spring and was friendlier to the Catholic 
Church than the communists.  Plus, the Vatican endorsed the recognition of an 
independent Croatia, which bolstered Tudjman’s claims.  The majority of Croatians held 
bonding outlooks since their attitudes towards Serbs and Muslims in Croatia were 
extremely negative (as late as 1997).100  This newly independent society placed great 
confidence in the Catholic Church, with the top cleric, Cardinal Kuharić, receiving 95 
percent confidence from Croatians (higher than Croatian President Tudjman’s 87 
percent).101  If using this last measurement as a proxy for influence, one could infer that 
the Catholic Church in Croatia did not use its influence to bridge but rather to bond.  
Indeed, though the Vatican had pushed the Catholic Church in Croatia and the Croatian 
people to forgive the atrocities committed against them in the 1990s, there was still 
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nding over of war criminals to The Hague and its linkage to EU 
accessi
                                                
the pope say you must forgive, but they don’t understand.”102  Additionally, there are 
lingering issues with the Catholic Church clergy, which is reactionary at times.103 
The final example in which the Catholic Church in Croatia has had mixed 
reactions is the ha
on.  The Catholic Church in Croatia has typically not been in favor of handing any 
native sons over to The Hague.  When the Croatian government decided in 2001 to 
extradite two Croatian generals accused of war crimes to The Hague, both the nationalist 
right and Catholic Church opposed the government’s decision.104  More recently the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) prosecutor, Carla Del 
Ponte, accused the Catholic Church in Croatia of hiding General Gotovina, Croatia’s 
most wanted war criminal.105  In September 2005, Del Ponte further shifted the blame 
from the Croatian government to the universal Catholic Church, claiming that the Vatican 
could rapidly find Gotovina.106  Though these allegations were not corroborated by any 
specific evidence and vehemently denied by the Catholic Church both in Croatia and the 
Vatican, there was sympathy for Gotovina among certain clergy of the Catholic Church 
in Croatia.  This attitude was exemplified by Bishop Bogovic, a self-proclaimed 
“Euroskeptic,” who claimed that the EU was “forcing entire Croatia to establish battle 
formations to run after Gotovina, who has exposed and sacrificed himself for this 
state.”107  When Gotovina was captured, there was no direct reaction from the Church; in 
January 2006, though, several Church clergy joined political personalities and Gotovina’s 
family in a “concert of support” for Gotovina.108  As for the EU accession linked to the 
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the Ustaša and also tried to promote a certain level of tolerance among the different 
ic was Bishop Stepinac (the top Catholic 
Church cleric), who quickly changed from his position of endorsing the Ustaša for their 
      
ICTY turnover, many clergy are fearful that Croatia will lose its sovereignty in another 
supranational institution, which in turn would diminish the amount of influen
ic Church has enjoyed since Croatia’s independence.109 
Today, the Catholic Church remains an influential voice within Croatian civil 
society.  Though it has officially eschewed a political role, it is nevertheless very engaged 
in promoting the Catholic Church’s societal agenda within the government.  Since the 
Catholic Church is the most trusted institution in Croatia, by proxy one can infer that it 
also has significant influence over society.110  The most prominent manifestation of the 
church’s influence can be seen in the Catholic Church’s efforts to change society’s laws 
to comply with its teachings.  For example, while it has not been successful in legally 
limiting abortion, the pro-life movement led by the Church has convinced 33 percent of 
the licensed clinics in the public health system to stop providing the procedure.111  
Furthermore, the Church has voiced its disapproval in such issues as artificial 
insemination and secular sexual education, which has led to legislative blocks within 
parliament and the Catholic Church being placed in charge of sexual education, keeping 
it within Catholic teaching.112  These actions are in keeping with the bonding tendency of 
the Catholic Church in Croatia, which has sought to establish its values upon society. 
2. Bridging 
Though the Catholic Church in Croatia seems to have had a tendency to be 
bonding in nature, there have been numerous instances in which it has displayed bridging 
capacities.  For instance, during World War II, certain Catholic clergy spoke up against 
religious groups.  The most prominent crit
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other progressive voices, which called for resolving differences with the Serbian 
Orthodox Church by building a joint-use cathed
anti-communist position to decrying their actions in his sermons in 1941.113  Stepinac 
appealed for tolerance, stating in one of his sermons that 
All men and all races are the children of G
distinction…For this reason, the Catholic Church has always condemned 
and does condemn, all injustice and violence committed in the name of 
theories of class race or nationality.114 
These bridging actions were not recognized by the Yugoslav government, which instead 
punished Stepinac’s resistance to the communist regime.115 
During the communist regime, there were Catholic clergy who advocated 
ecumenism.  Some of the more vocal clergy, in forming bridges with other ethnic groups, 
were ironically those who joined the communist priests’ associations.  The Croatian 
communist priest organization’s secretary, Vinko Weber, stated in 1978 that his society 
was ostracized by the mainstream Church since it included statutes which mandated its 
members to “promote the brotherhood and unity of our peoples, defend the achievements 
of the national liberation struggle, promote ecumenism.”116  The associations eventually 
petered out, especially due to the pressures from the Catholic hierarchy and the Vatican, 
which were dead set against the communist system.117  During Vatican II, there were also 
ral, which was immediately rejected by 
the more traditionalist clergy.118 
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in Croatia.  The most prominent 
critic w ions 
during aul II 
continu l, the 
protection of life, and promotion of peace.”119  Pope John Paul II also waded into the 
an’s party stop the war.120  
The in
s, the Catholic Church in Croatia has had support from 
the universal Catholic Church, which has sent its Non-Government Organizations (NGO) 
                                                
Bridging actions have also surfaced in more recent times.  Even during the 1990s, 
members of the Catholic clergy spoke up against the war 
as the pontiff himself, who rebuked Tudjman’s anti-Serb and anti-Muslim act
his visits to the country in 1994, 1998 and in 2003.  Pope John P
ously called for the “need for forgiveness, reconciliation, spiritual renewa
politics of the conflict when he successfully led the charge to remove the leader of the 
Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia and demanded that Tudjm
stallment of Cardinal Bozanic in 1997 as the head Catholic leader in Croatia has 
accelerated the Catholic Church in Croatia’s reconciliation efforts to heal the wounds of 
war and increase understanding with other religious groups, which have in turn resulted 
in improved overall intercommunal relations.121  Cardinal Bozanic’s efforts have 
included broadcasting ecumenical shows on the Catholic radio and meeting in inter-faith 
fora to develop legislation for the law on religion.122  Bozanic pled for more trust in his 
1998 Easter message, stating that the growing distrust within the Croatian society could 
“lead the nation into a state of illness.”123  The reconciliation efforts by Bozanic have 
also extended to the still-open wounds of World War II, claiming the healing will take 
time, on both sides but that the Church “can play a role in that process;” he has also taken 
such actions as investigating allegations of Masses celebrating Ustaša leaders.124  In 
addition to its leadership’s effort
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to assist Croatia in the building of civil society as well as the reconciliation process.  One 
such NGO, Pax Christi, has been in Croatia since the early 1990s.  In December 1992, 
this organization organized an interfaith prayer service, which drew about two hundred 
Zagreb citizens, a Serbian Orthodox priest, a Jewish rabbi and an American Muslim 
imam.125  Catholic Relief Services, another worldwide NGO, has focused on such issues 
as post-trauma care – providing training to various professionals, including “medical 
personnel, social workers, doctors, teachers, and attorneys.”126  Finally, the worldwide 
Catholic NGO, Caritas, has garnered a high level of trust from the public, much higher 
than any media, government or other NGOs.127  As already mentioned, the Catholic 
Church in Croatia has also participated in ecumenical efforts, which was listed by 
Croatians as a key promoter of “peaceful conflict resolution.”128  Building these networks 
with other religions has produced a side benefit for the Catholic Church in Croatia – with 
its new allies it can mobilize more forces for its social agenda.  For example, in 2004 the 
Catholic Church in Croatia, the Serbian Orthodox Church and Muslim community joined 
forces to vocally oppose legalized abortion.  On the surface this declaration might seem 
banal, but in a country like Croatia which has experienced so much warfare, this kind of 
joint communication is actually a step forward in intercommunal relations.  On another 
positive note, the Catholic Church in Croatia has not used its high level of confidence 
among Croatians to influence the government to exclude other religions.  Croatia 
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3. Analysis 
As with most issues, the Catholic Church in Croatia has been more complicated 
than being one extreme or another in its influence and behavior towards other religious 
and ethnic groups.  The Church has exhibited both bonding and bridging influences, 
though it has tended to bond within its religious group and even at times the Croatian 
garnered satisfactory marks from the Croatian Helsinki Committee since well over forty 
religions now enjoy various tax breaks and other considerations.129 
Catholic clerics have recently called for support of the ICTY, including the head 
ecclesiastical authority of the Catholic Church in Croatia, Cardinal Bozanic, and Bishop 
Mrzljak (auxiliary bishop of Zagreb).  Shortly after the EU denied Croatia its anticipated 
accession talks in March 2005, Bozanic challenged to Croatians to “respect and utilize 
international institutions and the legal system to further the country's cause, rather than to 
denigrate them.”130  Considering Bozanic had been one of clergy opposing the handing 
over of war criminals (the key reason for the EU’s denial), this volte-face is even more 
remarkable.  Bishop Mrzljak emphasized that “The Hague was the place at which the 
truth about the Homeland War was told.”131  Furthermore, when a priest caused 
controversy in March 2005 by encouraging Gotovina not to surrender, the bishops of the 
Catholic Church quickly proclaimed this view was not the Church’s position.132  Though 
most of those within the Church hierarchy are not in favor of EU membership, Cardinal 
Bozanic has recently come out in favor of the accession process, by stating that resisting 
EU accession is “an escape into isolation without perspective.”133  This has been the 
furthest any Catholic Church official within Croatia has gone to endorse the EU.  This 
kind of attitude could help the Croatian society complete the necessary steps to meet the 
requirements of the EU accession process. 
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metimes grudgingly.  
It also 
                                                
ethnic group.  These nationalist leanings have nevertheless been moderated due to the 
Catholic Church in Croatia’s submission to papal authority, albeit so
seems that there have been differences of opinion between the leadership within 
the Catholic Church in Croatia and its lower clergy, where the leadership seems more 
willing to create bridges across divides within society, whereas other religions or political 
institutions and the lower clergy seems to be more defensive.  In any case, it will take 
time for the ecumenical and reconciliatory efforts initiated by the Catholic Church to 
filter down to the masses within civil society.134 
The pluralism within the Catholic Church in Croatia means that it does not have a 
complete monopoly over society.  Nevertheless, it has been accused of trying “to impose 
its particularistic ethical position as universal,” which can be detrimental to forging a 
pluralist civil society.135  Additionally, since the religiosity factor (those professing to be 
religious) has risen through the years, the Catholic Church has still had quite a bit of 
influence over society’s actions, especially among the young Croatians.136  For example, 
sexual activity among college freshmen went down significantly in a five-year period, 
between 1998 and 2003; this was attributed to an increase in religiously affiliated 
households and those young Catholic adults who took their religious education (in public 
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Catholic-based NGO successfully 
                                                
schools) seriously.137  Furthermore, according to the U.S. State Department, there have 
been measurable impacts, including the following: 
— Participation in government-sponsored yoga classes declined by 50 
percent when the Catholic Church stated this was “an attempt to introduce 
Buddhist practices in primary schools under the guise of exercise;”138 
— Participation in a government-sponsored international HIV/AIDS 
awareness program dropped from 100 to 60 percent when the Catholic 
Church objected to the mention of condoms;139 
— Stores closed on Sunday after a 
lobbied for stores to be closed (the law was later overturned).140 
Many Croatians viewed this last initiative to be inappropriate behavior on the Catholic 
NGO’s behalf.  It is difficult to find any measurable signs of the bridging side of 
religiosity and influence of the Catholic Church, but if looking at the overall estimate of 
the Croatian civil society by the CIVICUS index on civil society, civil society is 
developing, albeit slowly.  According to the CIVICUS index, Croatian civil society is low 
on certain key issues like transparency and poverty but is doing much better on non-
violence, tolerance, democratic values and gender equality; overall the society is in the 
negative but trending up category.141  Besides the civil society, the Catholic Church in 
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ian Prime Minister Sanader in 2005: 
“This [ tholic 
Church  it has 
shown ud s.143  Time 
will te future 
develo
D. 
Chu ty.146  For example, in the 
I’s 
e 
Croatia and the universal Catholic Church have influenced the government’s policies on 
reconciliation and toleration, as claimed by Croat
tolerance and reconciliation] is a policy of the Holy Father.”142  The Ca
 in Croatia has contributed to this civil society’s progression, even though
itself to be a more bonding influence on society’s behavior and attit e
ll if the foundations of the bridges being built today will bear out in the 
pment of Croatian civil society. 
 
RUSSIA 
The Russian Orthodox Church has devoted most of its energy to its role as a state 
actor throughout much of its existence, instead of being an autonomous actor, shaping 
Russian civil society.  The Russian Orthodox Church inherited many aspects of the 
Byzantine Church, including Caesaropapism (church subservient to the head of state).144  
The Church actually became completely part of the government under Peter the Great, 
when he dissolved the Russian Orthodox Church Patriarchate and set a course for 
eliminating sects, such as the Old Believers who did not serve the interests of the state.145  
During the Russian Empire, the Russian Tsar was considered the head of the Orthodox 
rch; it legitimized his rule and reinforced a Russian identi
nineteenth century, the Church’s bonding tendencies complemented Tsar Alexander II
nationalist or Russification agenda; all those who were non-Orthodox were persecuted.147  
Converting other ethnic groups to Russian Orthodoxy as the Empire grew “forged a sens
                                                 
142 “Sanader Says Mesic’s Attempts to Delude Croatian Public Unacceptable,” Zagreb HINA, 8 
January 2005.  Available from FBIS. 
143 Though the Church undoubtedly contributed to such efforts as promoting toleration, it was mos
likely reactions to specific events versus an overall advocacy for tolerance.  Overall tolerance has been 
largely advocated by others such as “women’s organizations and homosexual and l
t 
esbian groups.”  See 
Bež
Old Believers were Russian Orthodox fundamentalists and quite xenophobic.  Though Tsar 




anovsky, A History of Russia, 5th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 
394
ovan, Zrinščak and Vugec, “Civil Society in Croatia,” 53-54. 
144 Runciman, 73. 
145 The 
sians rejected Peter’s modernizing reforms.  Many believers went underground or fled to Siberia.  See
s H. Billington, The Icon and the Axe (New York: Vintage Books, 1966), 192-197.  See also 
ciman, 337. 
146 Runciman, 324-325. 
147 Nicholas V. Rias
. 
33 
.151  This compliancy was rejected by quite a few 
Russian Orthodox believers, who went underground as the “True Orthodox Church.”152  
munist era, the Russian Orthodox Church seemed primarily 
concern
of unity.”148  Even after the communists took over Russia, the Russian Orthodox Church 
continued this tradition of subservience to the reigning government.149  An element 
within the Russian Orthodox Church, known as the Renovationist Church, embraced the 
new regime and at one time controlled the Russian Orthodox Church within Russia.150  
One of these Renovationists, Metropolitan Sergii, was appointed the head of the Russian 
Orthodox Church by Stalin, and was so totally compliant with the Soviet Regime he 
denied Soviet persecution of the Church
Throughout the com
ed about its survival and not about “the defense and protection of believers or 
advocacy of individual rights.”153  The Russian Orthodox Church in Russia was still at 
the complete mercy of the regime’s whim – often still persecuted (though members were 
no longer killed), sometimes ignored, but the official church leadership remained co-
opted.154  It was also regularly manipulated, whether as an instrument to help mobilize 
forces in World War II or to emit “positive propaganda” on the Soviet Union’s behalf in 
such ecumenical fora as the World Council of Churches (WCC).155  The only time any 
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Church, but also several challenges.160
ced before, either under the tsar or the 
161  This agenda has been 
assisted by an increasing identification of the Russian population with Russian 
Ort es to 
 
Russian Orthodox leadership contradicted the Soviet leadership was in 1980, when three 
of its bishops joined the WCC in declaring “serious concern” about the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan (the declaration also condemned NATO’s tactical nuclear weapon 
deployment decision).156  When Gorbachev came to power, the Russian Orthodox 
Church’s situation improved since he overturned many restrictions on religion, and by 
1988, the Russian Orthodox Church and the state joined forces to celebrate 1000 years of 
Christianity in Russia.157   
It seemed that the Russian Orthodox Church under tsarist rule formed mostly 
bonds within society.  As for during the Soviet regime, the Russian Orthodox Church’s 
lack of resistance and subservience to the government left it in a “hemmed-in state” and 
too isolated to shape society.158  The lay Russian Orthodox blasted their leadership “for 
failing to care for the flock committed to their charge by the church.”159  This situation 
changed after the fall of communism, when the Russian Orthodox Church was able to 
assert itself as an independent public actor for the first time. 
1. Bonding 
The fall of communism brought many opportunities for the Russian Orthodox 
  In the 1990s, the Russian Orthodox Church 
gained an independence it had never experien
communists.  With this new freedom, the Church wanted to establish its own agenda 
within the political realm and be the shaper of Russia’s future.
hodoxy.  During the 1980s, about seventy percent of Russians declared themselv
be atheist.162  By 2002, about fifty-eight percent of Russians considered themselves
                                                 
156 Ellis, 213. 
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158 Another factor was that religiosity was severely low – in the 1970s, Russian religiosity hovered at 
around 20 percent.  See Ellis, 174, 304. 
159 Ibid., 213. 
160 For instance, Patriarch Aleksii II was implicated of having worked for the KGB; this came to light 
duri s on the Russian Orthodox Church’s activities were 
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It must be noted that unlike the Catholic Church in Croatia (or 
the Ser
s set the norm for Russian 
society…other religions [in Russia]…are expected to conform, to some extent, to the 
Orthod
Orthodox (of which forty-two percent were strictly cultural Orthodox), about thirty-one 
percent of Russians considered themselves atheist, five percent as Muslim, one-half 
percent as Jewish and negligible numbers of Buddhists.163  By 2006, the number of 
Russians who identified themselves as Orthodox jumped to about seventy percent, though 
the religiosity numbers stayed about the same, about ten percent.164  The Russian 
Orthodox Church’s trust levels range between thirty-eight to fifty-four percent, 
depending on the polls.165  
bian Orthodox Church), the Russian Orthodox Church is not the number one 
institution trusted by Russians – President Putin takes those honors.166  By restricting the 
pool strictly to non-government institutions, however, the Russian Orthodox Church is 
considered the most trusted by far; this trust is not due to the Russians’ religiosity but 
rather to “the institution itself, which is seen as less corrupt and more competent than 
other institutions.”167  Also, despite the explosion of religious diversity in Russia, 
Russians have a certain “expectation that Orthodox value
ox norm.”168  Though its influence on Russian citizens’ individual decisions on 
morality is much weaker than in the Croatian case, the Russian Orthodox Church’s 
influence has increased significantly over the past few years.  The trust and expectations 
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ple is the Moscow Patriarchate-Ministry of Defense agreement in 
hin 
      
of Russians vis-à-vis the Church can, on the surface, be used as a proxy of measurement 
of the Russian Orthodox Church’s influence in society at large. 
As it has pursued its agenda since the downfall of communism, the Russian 
Orthodox Church has increasingly exhibited bonding-type behavior.  Based on the 
Orthodox membership growth in both numbers and level of trust, it seems the Russian 
Orthodox Church has acted as if it is the official religion, even though the Russian 
Orthodox Church denies such motives.169  The Russian Federation is legally a secular 
state and lay Russians reportedly do not want the Church to interfere with politics, but 
these facts have not stopped the Russian Orthodox Church from claiming it is the 
champion of the “Russian national idea.”170  It has done so through a series of bilateral 
agreements with individual state institutions, including the police, military and interior 
security forces, education and hospitals, and even metro stations.  These agreements seek 
to establish the Russian Orthodox Church as the primary religion in each of these 
allegedly secular institutions (other religions are excluded or marginalized), which leads 
one to conclude that Orthodoxy is trying to become the legitimate ideology of Russian 
state tradition.”171  All of these actions might be more or less benign were it not for the 
fact that through these relationships the Russian Orthodox Church has encouraged the 
state to exclude other religions in public institutions in exchange for allowing the state 
the religious-political moves by the Russian Orthodox Church is the push to establish
Orthodox chapels in Moscow.  When asked why there were no plans for inter-faith
chapels, the Orthodox priest in charge of coordinating the project responded: 
Orthodoxy is the state-forming religion and it is inappropriate to talk about 
some kind of democracy and equality of confessions in t
Another stark exam
1997.  This agreement states that in exchange for a re-establishment of Orthodoxy wit
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 “expose scoundrels who 
refuse 
ities follow 
           
the military, the Orthodox Church would encourage conscripts to serve their time.  More 
disconcerting, however, is the agreement that the Church would
military service by hiding behind faith.”173  The Russian Orthodox Church has 
also entered into foreign policy and local politics.  The Russian Orthodox Church is co-
chair, with the Russian government, of the World Council of Russian People.174  At the 
most recent council in April 2006, there were two items on the agenda – the role of 
Russia in the world and the question of the universality of human rights.  First, both the 
Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian government sought to emphasize Russia’s 
uniqueness, clamoring for Russia to “once again [become] one of the most powerful 
states;” the Russian Orthodox Church proclaimed it should exert more influence in 
European issues as more Orthodox countries enter into the EU.175  Of note, this vision is 
not shared by the Russian people – only thirty-four percent of those polled wanted Russia 
to become a superpower.176  Second, the council also passed a "Russian Declarations of 
Human Rights,” which proclaimed that “faith, morality, sacred objects, the Motherland” 
are just as important as human rights and that 
one should not allow a situation under which the concept of human rights 
suppresses faith and moral traditions…According to the document…‘it is 
the religious tradition [that is designed] to distinguish between the good 
and the evil’…President Putin endorsed that role [of the Russian Orthodox 
Church being the ‘ultimate guide’ for Russian society].177 
This role of ultimate guide seems to have extended to local politics as well.  For instance, 
the Russian Orthodox Church has worked with local governors to keep “alien religions” 
out with public money or mandating that regional government food facil
                                      
173 Fagan, “Russia: Orthodox becoming first among equals.” 
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174 This council was established in 1993; its mission is to “[bring] together Russians from home and 
abroad and is under the aegis of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Kremlin.”  See Victor Yasmann, 
“Russia: the Orthodox Church and the Kremlin's New Mission,” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, 10 April 
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176 The rest of the poll numbers: “38 percen
tries in the world; only 14 percent agree Russia should be a regional power; and 7 percent say Russ
should back away from any global ambitions at all.”  See Ibid. 
177 Ibid. 
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Orthodox Lenten guidelines (no meat).178  The abovementioned examples point to the 
Russian Orthodox Church’s increased influence and involvement in politics.179 
Bonding behavior has extended to civil society, where the Russian Orthodox 
Church has viewed outside Christian-based sects, such as Roman Catholicism, Jehovah’s 
Witnesses, Church of Latter Day Saints and any form of Protestantism, as dangerous to 
its agenda.  These religious minorities already were encountering discrimination by 
1993.180  Furthermore, elements of the Russian Orthodox Church have acted within the 
political realm to legally limit these sects’ activities.181  The 1997 Law on Freedom of 
Conscience and Religious Associations has been tweaked several times, each time 
making it more restrictive for non-traditional religions to participate in the Russian public 
sphere.182  It seems as if the Russian Orthodox Church “feels happiest to live with 
[denominations which] are all non-Christian.”183  Furthermore, the U.S. State 
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increased power, are its sources of revenue.  First, one o
twining with the government, as well as its 
f the more lucrative sources would have to be the 
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fees, alc , “The Reaction of the 
Russians to the Country’s Demographic Decline,” (Michigan State University, n.d.), 
from oil exports” first offered in 1994 by the Russian government, which was estimated
out five years worth of the Church’s deficit. Other sources of income have included the selli
and rental properties, as well as donations from abroad, including some from other Christian
 (Catholic, Episcopal Lutheran).  See Sergei Chapnin, “Frankly Speaking: The Income of th
Orthodox Church,” East-West Church & Ministry Report 9 (Winter 2001): 15-16. 
, from 1996-1998, the Russian Orthodox Church had “a special license to import, free of cu
ohol and tobacco products to fill its coffers.”  See Vladimir Shlapentokh
http://www.msu.edu/%7Eshlapent/demography.htm (accessed 17 May 2006). 
Finally, Diamond mining is another activity in which the Russian Orthodox Church has been involved 
(at least up until the early 2000s); all these activities have led to allegations of corruption.  See “Russian 
Church Linked to Crime, Corruption,” Vancouver Sun, 30 June 2000, 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/nations/corrupt/russia2.htm (accessed 14 May 2006). 
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181 As with the Catholic Church in Croatia, the Russian Orthodox Church is not monolithic and has 
expe ced both bonding and bridging tendencies, as will be shown in the bridging section. 
uddhism, though these too have been 
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.  Translated from Russian by FBIS. Available from FBIS.  See also U.S. Department of 
State, “Russia” in Annual Report on International Religious Freedom 2005 (Washington, D.C., 8 
Novem 5), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2005/51576.htm
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182 Traditional Russian religions include Islam, Judaism and B
ect to harassment. Furthermore, Metropolitan Kirill, Moscow Patriarchate’s Department for External 
Church Relations chair, claimed that “the fact that Catholics and Protestants have each had parishes on 
Russian soil for between 200 and 300 years does not…qualify them as ‘traditional religions.’” See 
“Dissident Gundyayev. Why did Rice not Consult with Kirill?” Moscow Moskovskiy Komsomolets, 2 
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 society. We, by God's mercy, 
186 
nd only on 
 
e to 
Department reported in its 2005 Annual Report on International Religious Freedom that 
since the religion law is subject to interpretation, disturbing events occur, such a
Local officials, reportedly often influenced either by close relations with 
local Russian Orthodox Church authorities or the FSB, sometimes refused 
outright to register groups or created prohibitive obstacles to 
registration.184  
The main concern the Russian Orthodox Church harbors towards non-traditional religions 
is of course that they are proselytizing on their turf and to their people.  This attitude is 
not necessarily a bad type of bonding, since most religions do this.  The universal 
Catholic Church, for example, has continuously protested to Protestant churches that they 
are treading on Catholic turf in Latin America.  Nevertheless, what is worrisome 
concerning the Russian Orthodox Church is that in addition to the already mentioned 
political forays, it has actively sought to bar other religions from public and private life.   
The Russian Orthodox Church has also had s
Russia, though not nearly to the same extent as the Catholic Church in Croatia.  That i
on issues like abortion, the Russian Orthodox Church has had almost zero influence – 
high rate of abortions has continued (two-thirds of all Russian pregnancies
terminated), despite the impending demographic crisis.185  It seems that the Rus
Orthodox Church nevertheless views itself as being influential.  In April 2006,
Metropolitan Kirill rebuffed social scientists’ allegations that the R
Church had little influence over society, stating 
do not let some false sociologists scare us today with t
percentages of the presence of Orthodoxy in
are an Orthodox country and Orthodox people.
There are signs that the Church’s influence is growing, albeit sporadically a
select issues.  In 2003, a group of six vandalized an art exhibit considered blasphemous
by Russian Orthodox; their arrests on the charges of “hooliganism” were nullified du
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parade.190  The gay parade organizers pressed ahead with their plans on 27 May 2006, 
Church
efforts of a Russian Orthodox priest.187  In January 2006, the Russian Orthodox Church 
convinced a pharmacy in Yekaterinburg to ban condoms and only sell Or
ed products.188  In May 2006, the Union of Orthodox Citizens claimed that 
s motivation…is effective to increase birth rate.”189  It also warned that it w
e Russian Orthodox parishioners to peacefully block a planned gay-ri
without permission from the Moscow mayor and faced several violent clashes with 
protestors.  It is unclear if the Russian Orthodox protestors were involved in this violence 
since there were several nationalist and other groups among the protestors.191  This case 
and the other previously mentioned examples are more evidence of the Russian Orthodox 
Church’s bonding behavior within civil society. 
2. Bridging 
With the focus on asserting itself within government, the Russian Orthodox 
 has not had as much focus devoted to building bridges within civil society.  An 
initial step towards forming a platform from which it can build bridges has been the 
Sacred Bishop’s Council release of the “Bases of the Social Concept” document.  This 
document, released in 2000, formally outlined the Russian Orthodox Church’s position 
on several social issues for the first time, ranging from warfare, labor issues and 
cloning.192  The document does have elements of bonding (e.g., patriotism, Orthodox 
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http: 765C477.html
190 This group also linked its anti-homosexual protests to the 10 May 2006 state-of-the-nation address 
by President Putin.  Putin offered monetary incentives and other benefits for Russians to have more 
children to help resolve the demographic crisis.  It stated that “the latest address of the President to the 
Federal Assembly poses the demographic issue as essential for Russia’ sovereignty and national survival.  
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191 “Russia: Gay Activists Tout Success of Rally,” RadioFreeEurope/Radi
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hurch’s Social Concept,” Russia Profile II, no. 8 (October 2005): 23. 
 2006). 
192 Unfortunately, this initial attempt at a social justice philosophy received lukewarm response from 
inner circles of the Russian Orthodox Church, as well as other elements of Russian society.  See Serge
Chapnin, “The Orthodox C
41 
o been expressions of sympathy for the 
traditio ergone attacks.  For example, in January 2006, Patriarch 
Alexii 
Vatican and the Russian Orthodox hierarchy, not necessarily with the local Catholic 
n is 
ristian values.”197  He recently went to see Pope Benedict XVI and 
 
values in society) but this was a tremendous initial effort at trying to build a systematic 
approach to social justice issues; the document also condemned as sinful the replacing of 
the “nation in the place of God or reduce[ing] faith to one of the aspects of national self-
awareness.”193  Implementing this document would assist the Church to be fully engaged 
in civil society. 
Besides the “Bases of the Social Concept,” the Russian Orthodox Church has also 
engaged in preliminary bridging steps within the Russian society.  On the domestic level, 
the Russian Orthodox Church established the Interfaith Council of Russia, which has 
included the four traditional religions (though it excluded the Protestants and Catholics).  
This council is meant to increase intercommunal communication, tackle societal issues 
and embrace common values.194  There have als
nal faiths that have und
II, in deploring an attack on a Moscow synagogue, stated that all Russians should 
“prevent such expressions of ethnic and religious intolerance.”195  Furthermore, the 
Russian Orthodox Church proclaimed their support of the Muslims’ outrage over the 
Danish cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad in 2006.196 
There have also been some tentative forays into ecumenism with other Christian 
faiths, most notably with Catholicism.  These have been accomplished between the 
Church.  Russian Orthodox Church Metropolitan Kirill remarked that this cooperatio
needed to “protect Ch
both sides agreed that they needed to strengthen the relationship to combat the “climate
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ian counter-terrorism efforts.  Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman 
Mikhai
eled against the 
Russian Orthodox Church, the Russian Orthodox Church has attempted to build 
interco
Chechnya, Russia has largely avoided inter-communal (ethnic or religious) violence, 
                                                
of runaway secularism in much of Europe.”198  Several experts assert this cooperation is 
only a marriage of convenience since many tensions still exist; nevertheless, the more 
interaction occurs between the two churches, the better the chances for intercommunal 
associational networking.  The Russian government has recognized that the dialog might 
also assist Russ
l Kamynin stated 
World religions may contribute greatly to the inter-civilizational dialog 
and to the development of a model of international interaction that will not 
use religious slogans to uncoil extremism and violence.199 
At the international level the Russian Orthodox Church is a member of the World 
Council of Churches, which is probably the largest worldwide ecumenical movement.  In 
November 1999, the Russian Orthodox Church also participated in a seminar which 
included representatives from thirty-three different Christian faiths.200  Finally, at the 
local level the Russian Orthodox Church has collaborated with some other churches on 
various charity projects and further intercommunal communication.201  Though done 
incrementally and accusations of “hegemonic ecumenism” have been lev
mmunal dialogue and solidarity with other religions found within its borders.202 
On the societal level, the Russian Orthodox Church has not taken as much 
bridging action as in the religious ecumenical realm.  Its leadership, however, has “taken 
care in its public statements to stress the need for tolerance of all religious groups in 
Russia.”203  It should be noted that with “the obvious and important exception of 
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 “Bases of the Social Concept” but it will take more work and 





fragmentation, and religious warfare” such as that experienced by the former 
Yugoslavia.204  Finally, the Church has also taken tentative steps into charity work, 
though its efforts are still at the infancy stage.  It has nevertheless cooperated on a 
sporadic basis with mainstream Protestant groups, as well as the Catholic charity 
“Renovadis” to minister to flood victims, orphans and the poor.205  The framework has 
thus been set, through the
 to have an operational plan to deal with the many societal needs of the Ru
. 
3. Analysis 
The Russian Orthodox Church has only been an actor within civil society for a 
few years and yet has seemed determined to quickly ensure its dominance in Russian 
society.206  It is nevertheless internally pluralistic, a position that has been accepted by 
the Russian Orthodox leadership since the early 1990s, when it decided “to abandon any 
effort to create a unified ‘Orthodox’ social and political movement” and instead allowed 
for diversity within a certain set of parameters; this action has mitigated internal 
divisions.207  Though tolerant to a certain extent of Russian traditional faiths (Judaism, 
Islam, Buddhism), the tolerance has not necessarily extended to fellow Christians, as 
demonstrated by the tactics used to block minority groups from registering.  When the
een ecumenical actions with other Christian faiths, it has tended to be at the 
international level and at the Patriarchate level, not at the local level, as has been the case 
within Croatia.  Though the Church by and large has tended to be more bonding in 
nature, there are signs that the Russian Orthodox Church has engaged in some bridging 
activity.  The Church is still many years and perhaps several generations away from 
ering any true bridging behavior within civil society – the “Bases of the Soc
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sed to the forty-two percent who claimed “moral traditions and faith are more 
important than individual prosperity”).209  It will be interesting to track if these numbers 
will ch
could, at times, impede the government from reaching these standards.  Though the 
      
Concept” is a good first step.  Finally, the Church’s influence on society has been mixed.  
About forty-seven percent of Russians in April 2006 stated that they “would like the 
Church to more actively influence spiritual life of the society” and fifty-three percent 
recognized “unique role of the Orthodoxy.”208  All the same, most Russians do not agree 
with the Russian Orthodox Church’s collective identity vision – sixty percent of those 
polled preferred the “concept of rights and freedoms of a person, which the West 
considers as universal” and fifty percent stated their “main goal is individual prosperity” 
(as oppo
ange as Putin’s Russia becomes increasingly nationalist and employs questionable 
democratic practices.210 
 
E. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
Both the Roman Catholic Church in Croatia and the Russian Orthodox Church 
have displayed bonding tendencies in their past and even to this day.  Both churches have 
experienced internal divisions throughout their history and have not been monolithic in 
their approaches to various issues.  Their pasts have shaped their outlooks, which have 
tended to be conservative and anti-ecumenical.  Their influence over their societies has 
also varied.  Both have also pushed legislation which would be beneficial to their specific 
agendas, but sometimes they are oblivious to others’ sensitivities.  Both countries are also 
candidates for membership for international institutions – Croatia in the EU and Russia in 
the World Trade Organization.  Both of these organizations link membership to certain 
societal standard criteria.  At this juncture, however, their main religions do not have the 
wherewithal to make enough of a difference to accomplish these standards; instead they 
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churches have shown some progress towards bridging behavior they have not gone far 
enough – it will take years and a change of heart amongst a majority of the clergy.  The 
same seems to be true for the Serbian Orthodox Church, which has faced similar 


























III. REVERBERATIONS OF HISTORY IN SERBIA TODAY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
rthodox time has its own dynamic.  Its motion is spiral, not linear, which 
eans that Orthodox history moves in divinely ordained circles, as 
leasingly repetitive as the patterns on church vestments.  Empires and 
nds are lost and regained, lost and regained again, lost and regained, 
ntil the end of the world.  The past is never forgotten because it comes 
round again, and the future is never new.211  
istory plays a central role in the Balkan population’s daily disposition – the 
ghosts of the past are there, ready to surface in any conversation.  This factor came to 
light in a November 2005 policy forum commemorating the ten years since the signing of 
the Dayton Peace Accords.212  Though focused on Bosnia–Herzegovina, the forum could 
very easily be applied to Serbia and other former republics of Yugoslavia.  During the 
panel on truth, justice and reconciliation, unresolved problems quickly emerged, such as 
the num orld War II and the number of people killed in 
the 199 s wars.  Th point to start these 
kind of “who did what to whom” accountability exercises – the Yugoslav kingdom of the 
1920s? World War II? The 1990s?  This kind of historical baggage still reverberates 
today within the region’s civil societies and political entities.  Additionally, the area’s 
long subjugation (fourteenth through the nineteenth centuries) under the Ottoman Empire 
and in Serbia’s case, the allegoric effects of the Battle of Kosovo in 1389, are included in 
practically any discussion regarding the Balkans.  The Serbian Orthodox Church was the 
only Serbian institution that experienced all of these events firsthand. 
 
B. CRYSTALLIZATION OF A NATION 
1. Historical Context 
The early history and identity of Serbia and the Serbian Orthodox Church tended 
to be intracommunal and bonding in nature.  The Serbian kingdom’s founding father, 
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Stefan Nem ian 
Orthodoxy.  Sava maneuvered not only to consolidate his family’s power but also to 
y) from the Patriarch in Constantinople in 1219.  Some 
would y.”213  
The na 9.214  
After 1 rayed 
themse lth.215  
Kosovo also ian identity because it hosted the See of 
the Ser
anja’s son, Sava, is still considered to be the greatest saint within Serb
secure independence (autocephal
go as far as to say that Sava “founded Serbian statehood and national identit
tion’s identity did not, however, crystallize until the Battle of Kosovo in 138
389 and the subsequent subjugation by the Ottoman Empire, the Serbs port
lves as a suffering people, who had chosen spirituality over material wea
 emerged as a critical part of the Serb
bian Orthodox Patriarchy in Peć (akin to the Vatican See).  The Serbian Orthodox 
Church kept this Serbian identity alive during the time of the Ottoman Empire by holding 
services in the vernacular and serving as the “repository of limited education and 
administrative experience for Serbs.”216  The Serbian Orthodox Church was able to 
engage in these practices since it did not really challenge Ottoman rule and was thus 
granted autonomy for many years. 
A few centuries after regaining its Patriarchy in 1557, Serbian Orthodox 
autonomy was finally curtailed.  First, the Serbian Orthodox Church came under pressure 
from its sister church, the Greek Orthodox Church.  The Greeks had traditionally filled 
the role of Ecumenical Patriarch (first among equals), but this ecumenical attitude was 
squelched by the newly rich Greek traders (Phanariots) who wanted the Church to be 
                                                 
213 Tim Judah, The Serbs: History, Myth & the Destruction of Yugoslavia, 2d ed.  (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 2000), 18-20. 
214 The battle of 1389 in Kosovo is imprinted into the psyche of many Serbians.  According to the 
story, the night before the battle against the Ottomans, Serb King Lazar was given a
winning the battle and preserving his earthly kingdom or losing the battle but gaining
 choice between 
 the kingdom in 
heaven.  Lazar chose the latter and the following day, the Serbs lost the battle with Lazar paying the 
ultimate rice by being killed; there were also allegations of betrayal of one of Lazar’s closest aides to the 
Ottomans.  This story is analogous to the Passion of Christ who was betrayed and died so all could one day 
 is that it is the Serbian kingdom which 




Serbian Empire.”  Karadžić extolled King Lazar as the sacrificial Christ figure and proclaimed that “the 
state would one day be resurrected.”  Petrović-Njegoš focuses on the issue of treachery as the source of loss 
at K
5: The Serbian Revolution and the Serbian State,” Twenty-Five 
Lect
 p
be resurrected.  Of course, the one exception in the Serbian version
will b e Serb.  Until this kingdom is resurrected, th
enly Serbia.’   
The chronicles were later aggrandized during the height of nineteenth century nationalism by 
oets, including the Montenegrin Serbian Orthodox prince-bishop Petrović-Njegoš in the 1847 
poem The Mountain Wreath and Vul Karadžić, his contemporary, in his poem “The Downfall of the 
osovo.  See Judah, 34, 36-37, 64. 
216 Steven W. Sowards, “Lecture No 
ures on Modern Balkan History (The Balkans in the Age of Nationalism), page created May 1996, last 
modified 23 April 2004, http://www.lib.msu.edu/sowards/balkan/ (accessed 1 March 2006). 
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l cradle in Kosovo. 
aga ).  
e many different Kosovo stories into one effective 
ate a 
more Greek.  This was important since the Ottomans categorized all people of the same 
religion into a millet or nation.217  Since the Greeks were technically in charge of all 
Orthodox people, they were able to eliminate the Serbian patriarchate of Peć in 1766.  
The Greeks then installed their own countrymen in positions of authority within 
Serbia.218  Second, in 1690, a small number of Serbs joined the Austrians in fighting the 
Ottomans.  To escape Ottoman vengeance, about 30,000 Serbs fled to the Austro-
Hungarian Empire.  They were led by the Serbian Orthodox Church Patriarch Arsenije.  
The Serb refugees settled in what is now the Vojvodina region in Serbia, enjoying certain 
privileges not accorded to other religious groups within the Catholic Hapsburg Empire.  
The Serbian Orthodox Church moved its See from Peć to Sremski Karlovci (current day 
Vojvodina region), which became the center of Serbian religious and cultural life until 
the Serbian homeland broke away from the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century.219  
The Church was thus divided, first within its ranks due to the Greeks then due to a 
physical separation from its spiritua
No matter what the privileges the Austro-Hungarians had granted, Kosovo had 
been lost.  This further fuelled the Serbian Orthodox Church’s vision of the restoration of 
the glories of the Serbian Empire and a return to their New Jerusalem, Kosovo.  The 
Church safeguarded this vision even when many of its people would have forgotten.220  
The Church’s themes were appropriated by nationalists in the nineteenth century, then 
in throughout the twentieth century (e.g., Balkan Wars of 1912, 1913 and 1990s
The initial wave of nationalists wove th
rallying cry.  Many Serbs in the nineteenth century took the “Kosovo pledge” to cre
                                                 
217 A millet was “treated as a unit and governed itself according to its own laws…the religious head of
the group was responsible for good behaviour.”  Steve Runciman, The Great Church in Captivity: A Study 
of the Patriarchate of Const
 
antinople from the Eve of the Turkish Conquest to the Greek War of 
Inde
erved through epic poems and songs but as Judah noted, “It is 
imp
pendence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 78, 378-380. 
218 Ibid., 181-182, 379-380. 
219 Marcus Tanner, Croatia: A Nation Forged in War (New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 1997), 54-55. 
220 Granted, stories were also pres
ossible to underestimate the historical role of the church in keeping alive the idea of Serbia and its 
notion that one day the old state would, Christ-like, be resurrected…it was the church…which gave people 
a glorious past to look back on and hence a hope for the future.”  See Judah, 40- 43, 46-47. 
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ence from Serbia.223  Fortunately 
for the 
                                                
“Heavenly Serbia” or acted in the “spirit of Kosovo.”221  Kosovo thus became sacrosanct 
to not only the Serbian Orthodox Church but to the majority of Serbs as well.  The dream 
of returning Kosovo to Serbia fits into the doctrine of collective rights by asserting a right 
over a certain property – a dream that has continued to exist in defiance of the fact that 
Albanians have greatly outnumbered the Serbs for many years in the area.  The Kosovo 
dream exists even today for Serbia since Kosovo is a deep, almost subconscious symbol 
of Serbian identity, regardless of people’s religiosity.222  Moreover, this steadfast vision 
is still especially true for the Serbian Orthodox Church, as seen in the wrangling over 
Kosovo’s current status. 
2. Implications for Today: The Possible Shock of Losing Kosovo 
Kosovo came back under Serbian jurisdiction in the early twentieth century but 
was lost again when it became a United Nations (UN) protectorate in 1999.  The Kosovo 
Albanians, who constitute an overwhelming majority of the population (now 2 million 
versus 100,000 Serbs), have long clamored for independ
Kosovo Albanians (and not so for the Kosovo Serbs), the international community 
has decided not to wait any longer to commence the status discussions, despite several 
UN-mandated requirements not being even remotely fulfilled by the Kosovo Albanians, 
 
ion that “the distinctive 
wor inked with religious traditions have shaped the cultures of each nation in 
an en  never set foot in a church, temple, or mosque.”  So, even in former 
com st, 
x atheists.”  See Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, Sacred and Secular: Religion and 
Poli
221 David A. Steele, “Christianity in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo: From Ethnic Captive to 
Reconciling Agent” in Faith-based Diplomacy: Trumping Realpolitik, ed. Douglas Johnston (Oxford and 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 148-149. 
222 Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart claim in their theory on secularizat
ld-views that were originally l
during fashion…even if they
munist countries, the experience could be as follows: “we are all atheists; but I am a Lutheran athei
and they are Orthodo
tics Worldwide (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 17. 
223 Daniel Williams, “In Kosovo, Two Peoples Look Across Bitter Divide,” Washington Post, 22 
November 2005, A22, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/11/21/AR2005112101717.html (accessed 22 November 2005). 
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 the churches and monasteries, as they have been under UN 
protect   D  These 
experie
destroyed since June 1999.  The book, authored by Father Sava of the Decani Monastery, 
posed the following question: 
                                                
including critical issues about the protection of minorities and a market economy.224  By 
October 2005, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan, probably reflecting the 
international community’s “Kosovo fatigue,” called for status talks to begin.225 
The Serbian Orthodox Church is in the middle of all this turmoil.  Immediately 
before and after the 1999 NATO bombing campaign, it became the sole political, social 
and cultural institution for the remaining Kosovo Serbs.  Clergy like Bishop Artemije 
stayed behind as the secular leadership left Kosovo.  As a result, he became a Serb 
spokesman on the domestic and international scenes.  The remaining Kosovo Serbs also 
started living in or near
ion. espite this protection, Serbs have been consistently harassed. 
nces have elicited both bonding and bridging behavior within the Serbian 
Orthodox Church. 
a. Bonding 
The Serbian Orthodox Church interpreted the attacks on Serbs by Kosovo 
Albanians as additional layers of Serbian martyrdom, the like of which had hearkened 
back to the Battle of Kosovo in 1389.  The Serbian Orthodox Church published a book 
entitled Kosovo Crucified in 2001 which detailed over 100 churches and shrines 
 
224 Any final status discussions had been contingent on the UN’s policy of “standards before status” – 
Kosovo’s social, political and economic institutions needed to first be functional.  These standards include: 
“(1) t of 
e with Belgrade; and (8) transformation of the 
Kos
adioLiberty, 21 September 2004, 
http
 the existence of effective, representative and functioning democratic institutions; (2) enforcemen
the rule of law; (3) freedom of movement; (4) sustainable returns of refugees and displaced persons, and 
respect for the rights of communities; (5) creation of a sound basis for a market economy; (6) fair 
enforcement of property rights; (7) normalized dialogu
ovo Protection Corps (KPC) in line with its mandate.”  See Steven Woehrel, “CRS Report for 
Congress: Kosovo’s Future Status and U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research Service (Washington, D.C., 
Updated 9 January 2006): CRS-2. 
Discussions for accelerating the final status talks popped up as early as 2004, from the UN’s special 
representative and a special commission on Kosovo.  See Robert McMahon, “Kosovo: UN Group 
Discusses Revival Of Political Process, Status Issue,” RadioFreeEurope/R
://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2004/09/1c4c8ba4-94dd-4b39-8d1c-6b5bbac7b8a3.html (accessed 5 
May 2006). 
225 Woehrel, CRS-2, CRS-3. 
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These 
arch 2004 attacks by Kosovo Albanians on Serbian property and 
people (over 9 8 
 nationalist) leader Nikolic repeated the Patriarch’s words 
when the discussions started in February 2006: 
Why was the world so resolute in trying to stop the mass exodus of 
Kosovo Albanians only two years ago but now watches passively and 
helplessly a Serbian people and their culture exposed to uncontrolled 
violence?226 
words are reflective of the frustration felt by the Serbian Orthodox Church.  It 
seemed to the Church and the Serbian people that the world was against the Serbs due to 
the inadequate response from the Kosovo authorities and the NATO forces when Serbs 
and their institutions were clearly being attacked.  Kosovo Crucified’s author, Father 
Sava, is credible in his complaint since he was not a nationalist during the 1990s; he and 
his fellow monks at the Decani Monastery had provided refuge to all, regardless of ethnic 
or religious background in Kosovo before, during, and after the NATO air campaign of 
1999.227  The attacks against Kosovo Serbs continued well after 2001, the high point 
being the 17-18 M
00 reported injuries).22
The situation potentially became more serious for the Church when UN 
Secretary General Annan declared the status talks would begin.  Patriarch Pavle decried 
any move for independence, claiming that any such move “would have the essential 
character of occupation.”229  The Patriarch’s proclamation has been taken up as a rallying 
cry by not only other church officials but also politicians like the ultra-nationalists.  
Indeed, Radical Party (extreme
                                                 
226 Sava Janjić, Rev., Preface to Kosovo Crucified, ed. Sava Janjić (Prizen: Diocese of Raska and
Prizen, 2001), 6.  http://www.kosovo.com/ckos/ckos06.jpg
 
 (accessed 11 March 2006). 




odox Church website, 4 November 2005, http://www.spc.org.yu/Vesti-2005/11/04-11-05-
y years, including during the Balkan wars.  See Steele, 150-153. 
228 Woehrel, CRS-2. 
229 “Address of his Holiness Serbian Patriarch Pavle on Behalf of the Holy Assembly of Bishops of 
the Serbian Orthodox Church Regarding Upcoming Negotiations on the Status of Kosovo and Metohija,”
Serbian Orth
e.html#add (accessed 8 November 2005). 
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end Kosovo-Metohija would also not defend Belgrade.230 
ratic process have displayed bonding tendencies to 
safeguard their
                                                
What was wrong about what I said?  I had the nerve to repeat the Serbian 
Orthodox Church’s position.  Well, others too could learn something from 
His Holiness about how to live their lives.  I believe that anyone who 
would not def
Considering that the Radicals are in position to win the next elections, 
Kosovo’s independence would make winning the elections that much easier.231  Kosovo 
is so important that a certain minority within the Serbian Orthodox Church would gladly 
support the Radicals if they thought the Radicals would bring Kosovo back to them.  
These include Serbian Orthodox Church youth groups who purport such slogans as “I 
believe in God and Serbdom.”232  These groups are typically xenophobic and generally 
intolerant of any social mores inconsistent with Orthodox teachings.  Granted, they are 
small in numbers, but they do receive funding from the Serbian Orthodox Church.233 
Even those elements of the Serbian Orthodox Church that are willing to 
work out a resolution within the democ
 church property.  The Serbian Orthodox Church has added its own agenda 
to the Kosovo final status process, which is not necessarily the same as Belgrade’s.  In 
February 2006, the Church released a document entitled “Basic Principles” which called 
for the establishment of protection zones at church sites.234  The Church requested a 
separate discussion on the international community’s responsibilities in protecting its 
religious sites, claiming that military protection would be required for several years to  
 
 
230Radmila Ognjanovic, “I am Not Inciting War,” Belgrade Vecernje Novosti, 13 February 2006.  
Translated from Serbian by FBIS.  Available from FBIS. 
231 The Radicals have jumped up in popularity in the last few elections and currently hover at about 
thirty percent in opinion polls (as opposed to the eleven percent sustained by the Serbian president’s party).  
See Igor Jovanovic, “Serbia Fights to Hold on to Kosovo, Montenegro,” International Relations and 
Security Network (ISN) Security Watch, 27 November 2005, 
http://www.Isn.Ethz.Ch/News/Sw/Details.Cfm?Id=13641 (accessed 23 January 2006). 
232 Ivana Petrovic, “Religious Right Makes a Pitch for Serbia's Youth,” Sarajevo Balkan Investigative 
Reporting Network, 16 December 2005.  Available from FBIS. 
233 Ibid. 
234 International Crisis Group, “Europe Report no. 170: Kosovo: the Challenge of Transition,” (17 
February 2006): 29, 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/170_kosovo___the_challenge_of_transition.






Church hierarchy is also trying to work within the system to prevent Kosovo from being 
completely lost to Serbia.  The Serbian Ort
any potential “de-Serbanisation” by the Kosovo Albanians.235  The S
ox Church thus seems to be maneuvering to protect its property, should K
dependence. 
b. Bridging 
Despite this bonding behavior, there have been signs of bridging activity 
concerning the delicate subject of Kosovo from the Serbian Orthodox Church.  The 
Serbian Orthodox Church hierarchy agreed to sign a document allowing repair on its 
destroyed churches (from the 2004 riots) in August 2005, which it had previously refused 
to do.236  The UN envoy to Kosovo, Soren Jessen-Petersen, lauded this step, stating that 
with the patriarch’s agreement, reconstruction of the churches would help to guarantee “a 
stable Kosovo, multi-ethnic and tolerant of religious sites.”237  The Serbian Ortho
hodox Church hierarchy has even sent bishops 
to participate in the discussions with the six-nation Contact Group for Kosovo.238  
Patriarch Pavle’s and the Holy Synod’s pleas in November 2005 reflect the final 
condition acceptable to the Serbian government regarding Kosovo: “more than 
autonomy, but less than independence.”239  More recently, on 23 April 2006, the Serbian 
Orthodox Bishop Teodosije of the Decani Monastary welcomed Kosovo President Fatmir 
                                                 
235 There is precedence of this kind of protection – since April 2005, the Decani monastery has been 
protected by the UN, which has helped calm the situation in the immediate area.  See Ibid., 29-30. 
236 After encouraging Kosovo Serbs to boycott the elections in November 2004, the Serbian 
government decided it would be better for the Kosovo Serbs to have a voice from within Kosovo 
provisional institutions since Kosovo Albanians would make decisions which would affect the Kosovo 
Serbs.  See “Draskovic Urges Kosovo Serbs to Join Province's Institutions,” Southeast European Times, 29 
June 2005, 
http://www.setimes.com//cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2005/06/29/feature-01 
(accessed 28 August 2005). 
237 “Kosovo: l’Envoyé de l’ONU Salue l’Accord de l’Eglise Orthodoxe Serbe à la Reconstruction des 
Sites Religieux.”  Centre de Nouvelles ONU.  28 March 2005.  Available at 
http://www.un.org/apps/newsFr/storyF.asp?NewsID=10134&Cr=Kosovo&Cr1=MINUK.  Accessed 2
August 2005. 
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hurch hosted a conference 2-3 May 2006 which included religious 





Sejdiu, a Muslim, stating “the doors to the Decani monastery are always open to people 
of goodwill and who bring the message of peace.”240  At the inter-religious level, the 
Serbian Orthodox C
e Islamic and Catholic
eran Church and Jewish community in Belgrade.  This inter-faith dialogue 
began before the NATO air campaign in 1999, and then continued under a more 
formalized medium, the Inter-religious Council of Kosovo, in 2001.  The May 2006 
conference was actually the first to be held by the council since talks had stopped due to 
attacks on Serbian Orthodox sites and Kosovo Serbs in 2004.  The forum was well 
attended by secular and foreign entities, to include the EU, the UN, Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and Italian forces from Kosovo Force 
(KFOR, which provided logistics support).  At this conference, Bishop Amfilohije of 
Montenegro stated that he hoped the dialogue would “help the healing of common 
wounds in the region of Kosovo [and would lead to] the overcoming of hatred among 
brothers and division.”241 
Bridging efforts by the Serbian Orthodox Church have yet to truly develop 
systematically within Kosovo civil society; the efforts are mostly kept at a higher 
leadership level.  One reason for this lack of bridging is that the Kosovo Serbs are 
cerned foremost about their survival since there are still attacks on the Kosovo Serbs
though much less than in 2004.  The next reason, tied to the first, is due to restrict
movement of the Kosovo Serbs.242  The efforts of the Serbian Orthodox Ch
                                                 
240 Of note, Kosovo’s Prime Minister Agim Ceku was denied access to services at another other 
Serbian Orthodox monastery in Kosovo as he is considered a war criminal by the Kosovo Serbs.  The 
official Church reasoning was stated more delicately, stating that since the Kosovo Serbs “have been living
with the status of refugees fo
 
r nearly a full seven years, outside our residence in Prizren, which was burned 
in th
 Denied,” B92 News, 20 April 
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e March 17, 2004 riots…we are not able to welcome Mr. Ceku before we have returned to our restored 
residence, and our people have return to their homes.”  See “Ceku’s Request
2006, 
http://www.b9
&dd=20&mm=4&yyyy=2006 (accessed 18 May 2006). 
See also “Kosovar President Attends Easter Services,” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty 24 April 2006,   
http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2006/04/4-see/see-240406.asp (accessed 18 May 2006). 
241 “Interfaith Conference Opens in Pec Patriarchate Monastery,” KIM Info Service, 4 May 2006, 
http://www.kosovo.net/news/archive/2006/May_04/2.html (accessed 18 May 2006). 
242 For more information, see U.S. Department of S
Rights Practices – 2005 (Washington, D.C., 8 March 2006), 
tate, “Kosovo” in Country Reports on Human 
http://pristina.usmission.gov/hrkos5.htm 
(accessed 18 May 2006). 
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outh together from the Kosovo Serb and Kosovo Albanian 
sides, has been
provide “youth leaders in Mitrovica with the peacebuilding tools and skills necessary to 
d up 
Kosovo’s have thus been focused on aiding Kosovo Serbs but many projects have been 
conducted in cooperation with other religious NGOs, especially the Catholic Church, the 
Serbian Orthodox Church’s fellow members of the World Council of Churches,  and the 
International Orthodox Christian Charities, as well as foreign governments (e.g., US, 
Greece).  These entities have provided money and expertise to the efforts aiding Kosovo 
Serbs still in Kosovo, as well as those who still have yet to return.  For example, a 
Catholic charity, Caritas-Austria, funded a Serbian Orthodox charity project in spring 
2000 to distribute seeds to nearly all Kosovo Serbs so they could plant vegetable 
gardens.243  There have also been some sporadic inter-ethnic initiatives in the few 
locations where the Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs are living in the same city 
(though separated).  These initiatives have not been sponsored by the Serbian Orthodox 
Church for the reasons already mentioned but do involve Serbian Orthodox laity.  Once 
such initiative is currently conducted in the town of Mitrovica – the epicenter of the 
March 2004 violence, symbolically still divided by a bridge.244  The Mitrovica City Wide 
Youth Council, bringing y
 mentored by Catholic charity Catholic Relief Services (CRS) even before 
the 2004 violence.  Recently, the CRS received funding from United States Institutes for 
Peace to help the Mitrovica City Wide Youth Council members learn about each 
religious group’s funeral rites, in the hope that there would eventually be free movement 
to visit their cemeteries.245  CRS has also hosted the “Peacebuilding Training for Social 
Change” effort which has brought two NGOs (one Serbian, one Albanian) together to 
create positive change.”246  Another charity, Catholic charity Caritas Kosovo, opene
a joint Kosovo Albanian and Kosovo Serbian youth center in Mitrovica in 2003.  It has 
                                                 
243 For more information, see Serbian Orthodox Philanthropy website, 
http://www.covekoljublje.org/proj_completed.htm (accessed 18 May 2006). 
244 “More Ethnic Fighting in Kosovo Leaves Thousands Homeless,” Catholic Relief Services (n.d.),   
http://www.crs.org/our_work/where_we_work/overseas/eastern_europe_&_the_caucasus/kosovo/emergenc
y_response.cfm (accessed 18 May 2006). 
245 United States Institutes for Peace Balkans Initiative, “USIP Grants Related to the Balkans” 
(Washington, D.C, n.d.), http://www.usip.org/balkans/grants.html (accessed 18 May 2006). 
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246 “Social Change through Peacebuilding,” Catholic Relief Services (n.d.), 
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focused its efforts on inter-ethnic training workshops, such as teaching journalism.  This 
center now publishes a magazine which “attempts to change local prejudice.”247  At this 
point, these inter-ethnic activities are sowing the seeds for future peace since the adults 
on both sides are not ready for reconciliation – the wounds are still too fresh.248 Indeed, 
inter-ethnic bridging in Kosovo has a long way to go but will become even more 
imperative, especially should Kosovo obtain its independence.  The Serbian Orthodox 
Church in Kosovo, though it has a very limited bridging role at the moment, has already 
proven itself capable of these actions in the past and there is no reason why it would not 




1. Historical Context 
In the beginning of his rule, Slobodan Milošević seemed to be an answer to 
certain Serbian Orthodox Church prayers.  He took up the nationalist cause and 
recognized the importance of Kosovo, even attending the 600th anniversary of the Battle 
of Kosovo in 1989.249  Milošević soon leveraged Serbian historical sensitivities regarding 
WWII by spreading propaganda that the Ustaša regime was being reinstated by Croatian 
nationalist Franco Tudjman.250  Propaganda also surfaced asserting that Serbian genocide 
was just around the corner – a story that was reinforced by the Serbian Orthodox Church 
in its official media.251  For example, the Serbian Orthodox Church Pravoslavlje 
                                                 
247 Darren Shore, “Building the Media Bridge: Uniting Youth in Divided Yugoslavia,” Centre des 
Medias Alternatifs du Québec, 4 November 2004, http://www.cmaq.net/fr/node.php?id=18756, (accessed 
27 April 2006). 
248 Ibid. 
249 Milošević appeared a strong man, ready to take up the cause of Serbia when in 1987 he uttered his 
now tect the allegedly beleaguered 
 Tsar.”  See Judah, 160, 162, 
e 
 and other kinds of abuse.  See Steele, 147. 
 infamous phrase “no one should dare to beat you” when claiming to pro
Kosovo Serbs from the Kosovo Albanians; this statement “enthroned him as a
163. 
250 As mentioned in Chapter II, this Nazi-affiliated regime went out of its way to kill all those who 
were not Croat.  The Serbian Orthodox Church also suffered tremendously as all 577 priests in Croatia 
disappeared, including 217 killed; 700 total clergy were killed in Yugoslavia.  See Pedro Ramet, “Th
Serbian Orthodox Church,” in Eastern Christianity and Politics in the Twentieth Century ed. Pedro Ramet 
(Durham and London: Duke University Press 1988), 237-238. 
251 The accusation of genocide is not a new concept for the Serbs.  The Serbian Orthodox Church 
alleged Kosovo Albanians were harboring genocidal tendencies against the Serbs in 1969 and 1982, 
including formal allegations of rape
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athering all Serbs to live under a Serb state.255  Certain elements within the 
Serbian Orthodox Church thus approved of Milošević’s political maneuvers and of his 
6  Some within the media and academia allege that the 
Church ings did not go well.257 
                                                
newspaper reported that “Ustasha ideology was being resurrected in Bosnia and that the 
Serbs would have to remain united in their support for those who protect [them].”252  
Furthermore, in the 1980s, certain elements of the Serbian Orthodox Church pursued a 
collective rights approach in line with the nationalist cause, as evidenced by the mid-
1980s tour of Tsar (now Saint) Lazar’s bones.253  Lazar’s bones were carried throughout 
Serbia and other places which were historically Serbian, including areas of Bosnia and 
Croatia.254  This tour occurred at about the same time the Academy of Arts and Sciences 
issued an extreme nationalist proclamation, commonly referred to as the Memorandum.  
The Memorandum alleged atrocities (genocide) in Kosovo against Serbs and advocating 
the right of g
wars of “self-determination.”25
 turned on Milošević only when th
Like all things, the relationship between the Serbian Orthodox Church and 
Milošević was much more complicated than the media seemed to portray.  There were 
several Serbian Orthodox Church elements that were quickly disillusioned by Milošević, 
some as early as his Kosovo appearance in 1989.  As Father Sava (one of Milošević’s 
most vocal critics) stated: 
 
252 Christos Mylonas, Serbian Orthodox Fundamentals: The Quest for an Eternal Identity (Budapest 
and New York: Central European University Press, 2003), 142.  Originally quoted in Pravoslavlje, no. 558
15 June 1990 and no
, 
. 559, 1 July 1990. 
eminder, Lazar was the hero of 1389, having chosen the heavenly kingdom over the earthly 
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arting up again.262  The 
Serbian
s could expand and eventually reconcile.264  Another example 
of ecumenical actions was the agreement to write a joint history as early as mid-1990s, 
                                                
In the late eighties we felt the national change and thought it would be a 
good thing…we thought [Milošević] would come to [the church of] 
Gračanica to bow down to the ideals of the past, the good, spiritual, moral 
traditions, but he did not.  He appeared like an antique god by helicopter.  
I saw at that moment that the change was going in the wrong direction.258 
Father Sava also later cautioned fellow clergy to refrain from practicing ethnophyletism, 
or giving primacy to “national interests [over] spiritual ones.”259  Some within the 
Serbian Orthodox Church hierarchy also voiced its displeasure with Milošević.  The Holy 
Synod called for his resignation in May 1992, and Patriarch Pavle led a couple of 
religious ceremonies and demonstrations during the same time frame.260  Pavle also stood 
in unity with other religious leaders, signing the Berne Declaration with Catholic and 
Muslim leaders in November 1992, demanding for an end of the war, as well as “the re-
establishment of peace and the renewal of dialogue.”261  It appeared as if the ecumenical 
movement which had been petered out by the 1980s was slowly st
 Orthodox Church hosted several ecumenical conferences, such as the 
“Ecumenical Dialogue on Reconciliation” in 1996, sponsored by the Conference of 
European Churches.263  During this conference, it was acknowledged that there were 
many open wounds and differing opinions but that there were several common points 
upon which the participant
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262 This is not to imply th
continue to be many more fits and starts in the process. 
263 The Croatian Catholic bishops did not attend this conference, though there was an universal 
Catholic presence.  See “Ecumenical Dialogue on Reconciliation,” Conference of Euro
grade, 19-22 February 1996): ii. 
264 Some of the common points included: the economy, the youth and the need for multi-cultural 
education.  See Ibid., 78-79. 
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approv tia.265  
These lding 
betwee
                                                
ed by both the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Catholic Church in Croa
types of activities were steps in the right direction of preliminary bridge bui
n the different communities.266 
2. Implications for Today: Turning Over War Criminals 
Patriarch Pavle and the Holy Synod again demanded Milošević’s resignation in 
1999 for the good of the Serb people.267  While Milošević fell rather quickly out of favor 
with the Serbian Orthodox Church, other Serbian leaders like Dr Radovan Karadžić of 
Republika Srpska did not, by and large.  Since Karadžić and others like him have been 
indicted as war criminals by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), admiration for the war criminals has continuously complicated 
matters for the post-Milošević Serbian government and for the Serbian Orthodox Church, 
as Serbia has balked at complying with ICTY demands.268  This contrarian attitude from 
the Serbian government has eventually changed, even though the society is still against a 
foreign entity trying its people.  There are several reasons for this change of behavior, the 
most important being that the Serbian government has been under enormous pressure to 
hand over its war criminals as a first step towards a coveted ticket to EU accession.   The 
EU mandate has been clear – turn over the war criminals or be refused any chance for 
accession.269  NATO has the same mandates.  Both of these institutions are vital to 
Serbia’s future prosperity and security. 
 
265 Tatjana Peric, “On Being Agents of God's Peace: Relationship and Roles of the Roman Catholic 
Church in Croatia and the Serbian Orthodox Church in Ethnic Conflicts in Former Yugoslavia,” Master’s 
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266 Nevertheless, there was still contradictory behavior from Serbian Orthodox leadership.   One ye
after Patriach Pavle had demanded that Milošević resign in 1999, Bishop Artemije critiqued Patriarch Pavle 
and other church leaders for attending a formal event with Milošević in 2000.  See Steele, 153. 
267 This demand embarrassed the government, which wasted no time denouncing the Church
spokesman for the reigning party warned “the old wise men of the Holy Synod that they ‘maintain the spiri
of the 5th ecclesiastic rule – pray for those in power’” and others warned “what if the government shaped 
the Synod?”  Se
inally published in Reporter, 28 June 2000, http://www.balkans.eu.org/article1922.html (accessed 26 
July 2005). 
268 Since the early 1990s, the UN has indicted alleged war criminals from the Balkan wars and h
pushed other international organizations to link member accession to cooperation with the ICTY. 
269 There is already evidence of this occ
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urring as the scheduled early May 2006 talks with the EU 
were  30 
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 postponed indefinitely since Serbia did not turn over the indicted war criminal General Mladic by
April 2006, as mandated by th
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he ICTY, with very few exceptions.  Bishop 
Amfilo  Ra rthodox Church 
leaders
 1998, he called for all Balkan leaders, including 
Milošević and Karadzic, to be indicted.274  He has been joined over the past year or so by 
r 
 General Vladimir Lazarevic to turn himself to the ICTY, praising his courage 
a. Bonding 
Until recently, the Serbian Orthodox Church did not encourage war 
criminals to turn themselves in to t
hije dovic, recognized as one of the more nationalist Serbian O
, described Karadžić’s mother at her funeral in May 2005 as “the mother of an 
immortal.”270  Furthermore, the ICTY has gone so far as to accuse the Serbian Orthodox 
Church of harboring Karadžić, and Bosnian media has claimed that he has adopted a 
monk’s disguise – all of which the Serbian Orthodox Church denies.271  Amfilohije 
changed his tune in August 2005, calling for Karadžić to surender, though emphasizing 
that it was Karadžić’s “personal decision...but I expect him to make that decision.”272  
This change of heart is not convincing to some experts since they view this type of 
behavior as a means to preserve nationalist-leaning and devout Orthodox Serbian Prime 
Minister Kostunica’s position in power.  This new behavior is also allegedly a way that 
“the Serbian Orthodox Church can be seen as modern, on one hand, while on the other 
hand it is de facto supporting war criminals.”273  These allegations imply that the Serbian 
Orthodox Church is still bonding, still seeking to protect its own kind. 
b. Bridging 
Father Sava once again served as a voice in the wilderness early in the 
process of bridge building.  As early as
other elements of the Serbian Orthodox Church, as more clergy have encouraged wa
criminals to turn themselves in to the ICTY.  In February 2005, Patriarch Pavle 
encouraged
                                                 
270 Nicholas Wood, “Serbian Nationalists Turn a Funeral into a Tribute to a Fugitive,” New York 
Tim
ter 
 Karadzic to Surrender,” Southeast European Times, 26 August 2005,   
http
es, 9 May 2005, A.4.  Available from ProQuest.  
271 Ibid. 
272 Bishop Amfilohije is related to Prime Minister Kostunica by marriage so perhaps since the lat
was feeling EU pressure, the former called for Karadžić to surrender.  See “Leading Serbian Orthodox 
Cleric Urges
://www.setimes.com//cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/feature-01 (accessed 29 August 
2005). 
273 “Serbian Orthodox Church Helps Premier by Supporting Surrenders to Hague Analyst,” Belgra
Radio B92, 2 February 2005.  Available from FBIS.   
274 Steele, 151. 
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to “take the ha  of the fatherland.”275  Other clergy have also come 
forward, like B
l baggage, has had 
to reevaluate where it belongs in a post-modern society.  It has been a painful dividing 
process at tim
the Islamic and Catholic ‘hordes.’  Moreover, Milošević manipulated the Serbian 
rd road in the interests
ishop Grigorije, when in spring 2005 he requested that all indictees turn 
themselves in to the ICTY; his call has since been echoed by other clergy.276  Some of 
these changes of heart can be tenuously linked to the corresponding changes in 
government policy.  Another event which might have helped the Serbian Orthodox 
Church change its mind about war criminals was the shock over the released tape of the 
events in Srebrenica in June 2005.  This was not a proud moment for the Serbian 
Orthodox Church, since the tape depicts an Orthodox priest blessing militia members 
before they committed their gruesome deeds.277  Subsequent to the tape’s release, the 
Holy Synod decried “the cold-blooded killing of unarmed, defenseless civilians.”278  This 
can be considered a further bridging step, since the Church has acknowledged this wrong-
doing against religiously different people. 
 
D. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
Serbia is still dealing with historical reverberations even as it orients itself to join 
the West.  The Serbian Orthodox Church, also laden with this historica
es.  The Serbian Orthodox Church’s actions today are not necessarily 
directly linked to specific historical events but they are heavily influenced by them.  The 
Serbian Orthodox Church continues to cling to the land of Kosovo; in 2005, Patriarch 
Pavle proclaimed, “[O]ur Kosovo today is a symbol of the Cross.”279  Moreover, the 
Serbian Orthodox Church has had a hard time seeing Serb brethren as war criminals for 
their actions in the 1990s because they are seen as defenders of the Serbian nation from 
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Orthodox Church as part of his deliberate political agenda.280  Yet, despite these factors, 
the Serbian Orthodox Church is not monolithic.  There has been an ongoing tug-of-war 
between the moderate and nationalist factions within the Serbian Orthodox Church over 
the issues of Kosovo and war criminals.  These factions can be found at play in many 
other issues, such as the status of minority religions, teaching religion in school, the 
Macedonian Orthodox Church, among others.  Elizabeth Pond asserted in late 2005 that 
“the outcome of this battle will have a strong influence on public opinion about Serb 
pride, European identity.”281  Most importantly, the Church should resolve these 
outstanding issues since it may be the only way it can finally break with cyclic Orthodox 
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IV. THE SERBIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH AFTER MILOSEVIC 
A. INTRODUCTION 
he state identity is completely lost. We have confidence only in church 
ow. All democratic institutions are extremely low, judiciary system, 
overnment and parliament. But the church is the only institution which 
resents some kind of identity. 
— Srdjan Bogosavljevic, Serbian pollster, National Public Radio: 
All Things Considered, 17 March 2006 
pinions vary greatly in assessing the Serbian Orthodox Church’s influence since 
the fall of Milošević in 2000.  Some claim the Serbian Orthodox Church is the worst 
enemy imaginable to a pluralist Serbian society, and it will impede Serbia’s chances to 
access the EU and NATO.  In their view, the Serbian Orthodox Church is narrow-
minded, only concerned about leveraging its newfound strength to become a state 
religion, to protect s agenda, including 
keeping other religions from practicing in Serbia.  Others counterclaim that while the 
Serbian Orthodox Church does have certain bonding tendencies (like all religions), it is 
actually a moderating voice and its endorsement can legitimize the Serbian government’s 
quest for integration into the Euro-Atlantic institutions.  The Serbian Orthodox Church 
can also help mitigate societal tensions through its reconciliation and ecumenical efforts.  
A third group claims that the Serbian Orthodox Church exhibits both bonding and 
bridging tendencies.  These differing opinions might seem banal on the surface, but there 
are some indisputable considerations: Serbians are searching for an identity since the 
demise of Yugoslavia; the Serbian Orthodox Church is often cited as the most trusted 
institution in Serbia; and the secular government is not so trusted.  The combination of 
these factors has opened up an unprecedented opportunity for the Serbian Orthodox 
Church to influence civil society.  Even with increased leverage and power, this church 
still seems as pluralistic in its approach as when it retained little power.283 
 






its property and to shape Serbian politics to fit it
 
283 Numerous examples exist but, in the interest of brevity, only a few will be examined. 
66 
B B
The Serbian Orthodox Church is reputed to exhibit exclusionary behavior to those 
x, the two identities being symbiotic.  Sabrina Ramet, a 
noted expert on the Serbian Orthodox Church, warned in 2005 that if the Church 
continu ot of 
reconci  
Serbian Orthodox Church a
world.”285  Tw  in the Serbian Orthodox Church’s 
bondin
. ONDS 
who are neither Serb nor Orthodo
es along an exclusionary path, “its culture will be one of hatred, n
liation.”284  Furthermore, in 2003 the International Crisis Group categorized the
s “one of the most conservative and isolationist in the Orthodox 
o basic kinds of agendas appear evident
g tendencies: a societal agenda to protect and sometimes expand religious turf and 
a political agenda that can in turn be used by the secular government to achieve its own 
ends. 
1. Societal Agendas 
Two instances come to mind when examining the bonding nature of the Serbian 
Orthodox Church towards society and its alleged mission of de-secularizing the Serbian 
society.  This mission is such since secularization has, according to the Serbian Orthodox 
Church, “reduced Serbia and its people to poverty.”286  First, the Serbian Orthodox 
Church has sought to contain proselytizing activity from newer faiths by initiating 
legislative changes.  Several attempts to regulate religion have taken place since the 
abolishment of the communist-era law in 1993.  Each of the six draft laws has attempted 
to narrow the activities of various religions, with primary benefits allocated to the Serbian 
Orthodox Church and six other traditional religions.287  Previous attempts to pass a law 
had proven futile until the Serbian National Assembly overwhelming passed the Law on 
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ligious Communities on 20 April 2006.288  There were several critiques 
regardi
rds, and it is not good for Serbia as a multiethnic civil society.”291  Also 
disconc the Serbian minister for religious affairs, Milan 
Radulo
                                                
Churches and Re
ng the process, including a lack of transparency to both the non-traditional 
religious communities and many within the international community.  Primarily, the non-
traditional religious communities rejected the Serbian government’s claim that the law 
had been accepted by all religious groups within Serbia.289  Other critics have proclaimed 
that the law is in violation of the Serbian constitution guaranteeing religious equality of 
all citizens before the law and in violation of the federal Charter on Human and Minority 
Rights and Civil Liberties of Serbia and Montenegro; the law practically sets up five 
different religious castes, each with less privileges.290  Finally, one Serbian lawmaker 
explained that she had voted against the law since “it is not in harmony with European 
standa
erting is the remark made by 
vic, regarding his goal for the religious law in April 2006: 
[It] is not so much to address religious liberties, since freedom of belief is 
a constitutional right…[as it is to] guarantee collective rights for religious 
communities.292 
These collective rights include further regulations on the return of confiscated church 
property (which would exclude non-recognized religions) and the trade-marking of every 
component of a registered religion’s name (so technically other orthodox religions like 
the Romanian Orthodox Church would not be able to register under their own name).293  
In a related issue, the Serbian government instituted an amendment in 2004 to the 
property tax law which changed from universal tax exemption for churches to exemptions 
 
288 On 27 April 2006, Serbian President Tadic’s signature enacted the law.  Tadic acknowledged the 
law 
 Controversial Religion Law,” Radio Free 
Euro
was “not exactly in accordance with all European conventions regarding human rights that Serbia-
Montenegro's parliament ratified in 2004, but that all of its shortcomings can be remedied with various 
changes and additions.”  See “Serbian President Signs
pe/Radio Liberty, 28 April 2006, http://www.rferl.org/newsline/4-see.asp (accessed 29 April 2006). 
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t of the Church’s effort 
to ensu  This 
request
removed Milošević from power.  By the fall of 2001, the public school system introduced 
children could potentially be segregated by their religion (or non-religion), which could 
extended only to the seven traditional faiths.294  These types of legislative activity, while 
not directly involving the Serbian Orthodox Church, have its fingerprints all over them.  
For example, in May 2005, the draft Law on Churches and Religious Communities was 
delayed since the government was awaiting the Serbian Orthodox Church’s edits on the 
legislation.295  This now signed law also provides the Serbian Orthodox Church with an 
“unofficial superior place among the traditional religious communities” (Article 12).296  
This does not mean that the Serbian Orthodox Church has become the official religion by 
any means, but it does mean that other religions, even those accorded similar privileges 
as the Serbian Orthodox Church, play second fiddle.  The increased legal standing for the 
Serbian Orthodox Church would work to the Church’s agenda of insuring its primacy 
within society. 
The second example of religious bonding is the Serbian Orthodox Church’s push 
including religious education in public schools.  This has been par
re traditional Orthodox mores are instilled in young Serbian Orthodox. 
 was submitted when the ink was barely dry following the 2000 elections which 
electives in religious education based in one of the seven traditional religions as well as 
classes in civic education.297  The Serbian Orthodox Church insisted on specific religious 
education over a multi-confessional approach, claiming “there is no such thing as a 
general concept, let alone a universal religion;” it also insisted the classes be mandatory 
(the choice being between religion and civics).298  This regulation caused immediate 
issues in multi-confessional regions like Vojvodina with thirty-nine registered religions; 
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es for their children.303  Despite initial complaints from the Serbian 
Orthod
result in “psychological distance between children of different faiths.”299  Other critics 
challenged the constitutionality of the decree, since it elevated certain religious sects 
above others (not to mention the fact that the state funds these programs).300  Another 
concern regarding this action was that by equating civic education (“the basics of 
democracy”) with religious education, it could be insinuated that knowledge about either 
subject is interchangeable.301  An alternative view offered by the Belgrade Centre for 
Human Rights was that the choice between a civics and religion class implied religious 
education “did not promote democracy, human rights and tolerance.”302  The religious 
education and civic education classes did not attract many enrollees at first, but this 
changed within a couple of years, with a majority of the parents opting for civic 
education class
ox Church (and the Catholic Church) that the Ministry of Education did not take 
the religious classes seriously enough, religious education in public schools has provided 
the Serbian Orthodox Church unprecedented access to Serbian youth to strengthen them 
against proselytization from other religions, as well as instill the basics of the faith.304  It 
has also provided an opening to teach its doctrines to non-Serbian Orthodox children 
since some children do not want to be separated from their classmates and thus attend the 
Serbian Orthodox classes.305  Religious education has raised eyebrows among human 
rights advocates, secularists and those of minority religions, confirming for them that the 
Serbian Orthodox Church is using its newfound influence to ensure collective rights for 
its faithful, whether its members agree or not with its actions.306  These bonding trends 
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344, 347. 
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Macedonian government and the Macedonian Orthodox Church, including going to the 
EU and the US with the evidence.  Also, the Macedonian president, Branko Crvenkovski, 
stat wo countries.”310  The 
      
are disturbing but not as much as the exclusionary tendencies displayed by the Serbian 
Orthodox Church within the political realm, especially since 2000. 
2. Political Agendas? 
At times it appears as if the Serbian Orthodox Church has gone beyond the 
normal bonding behavior religions exhibit and has become politicized to the detriment of 
other religious groups and secular entities.  These actions appear to also benefit the 
Serbian government’s political agenda (though it would be imprudent to state there is a 
direct link between the two agendas).  There are two instances that stand out regarding 
this ambivalent relationship.  First, it seems that the Serbian Orthodox Church has acted 
most vocally against schismatic Orthodox branches, namely the Montenegrin Orthodox 
Church and the Macedonian Orthodox Church.  Since having a separate national church 
lends legitimacy to an Orthodox nation, the fight between the Serbian Orthodox Church 
and the breakaway branches can take on a political tinge.  For example, the Macedonian 
Orthodox Church was established in 1967, with the blessing of the Yugoslav communist 
regime.307  Through the years this issue has been more of an internal religious question, 
but there recently have been allegations that the Serbian Ministry for Religious Affairs 
provides funds for the minority Serbian Orthodox Church in the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia (FRYOM).308  The Serbian government did not deny this 
allegation, stating it was legal to allocate funds “for the protection of ecclesiastical 
cultural heritage outside the borders of the Serbia-Montenegro State Union.”309  This 
revelation by the Serbian government has provoked several reactions from the 
ed the issue could “cast a shadow over ties between the t
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ishop Jovan, the head of the Autonomous Orthodox Archdiocese of Ohrid, FRYOM, 
swit  the Serbian Orthodox Church in 2002.  See 
Ibid.,
rch or the other Orthodox churches.  However, the Macedonian Orthodox Church claims it was 
independent for almost eight centuries, from 1019 to 1767 so it was natural that it would once again be 
independent.  See Sabrina Ramet, “The Politics of the Serbian Orthodox Church,” 2
308 Archb
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ies like Greece in the 
1990s.3  Macedonian government has been innocent in 
respect
Macedonian government is extremely sensitive about any kind of interference in its 
internal affairs from its neighbors due to obstruction from countr
11  This does not mean that the
ing other religions within its borders, as seen in the imprisonment of the top 
Serbian Orthodox Church cleric in the FRYOM.312  Regardless of this issue, it still 
appears that the Serbian Orthodox Church and Serbian government are directly 
interfering with a sovereign government’s domestic matters.  A manifestation of the 
Serbian Orthodox Church’s influence on the Serbian government in this matter is evident 
in Serbian minister’s following comments after he grounded Macedonian flights in 
Serbia: “After the patriarch, one should not speak and his decisions should not be 
commented on.”313  This is not to imply the patriarch ordered him to ground the planes, 
but the minister could have interpreted the patriarch’s condemnation of the Macedonians 
as a green light to act. 
There have been issues with other Orthodox churches in which the Serbian 
Orthodox Church has involved the Serbian government, such as the issue of the 
schismatic Montenegrin Orthodox Church.  This church broke off the Serbian Orthodox 
Church to form its own church in 1993.314  This schism also took on a political taint as 
Montenegrins neared their referendum on independence on 21 May 2006.315  This 
politicization was exemplified by the Serbian army’s use of one of its helicopters in 
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enturies before being annexed by the Serbian Orthodox Church in 1920.  See “The Continuity 
of Being Autocephalous,” Montenegrin Orthodox Church website (n.d), http://www.moc-
cpc.org/index_e.htm (accessed 24 April 2006). 
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hije on a tank that is running over everyone.  He is not 





August 2005 to install a Serbian Orthodox Church chapel on land considered holy by 
Montenegrins.316  It seemed to send a message to the Montenegrins that the Serbian 
Orthodox Church and the government were unified in acting against Montenegrin 
independence.  One Serbian politician who vehemently denounced this action, Nenad 
Canak, was targeted by the Serbian Orthodox Church.  Canak has been a secular advocate 
for Vojvodina autonomy and has empathized with the Montenegrins, who provided him 
shelter during the 1990s (when he was part of the opposition to Milošević).317  He has 
spoken consistently against Serbian Orthodox Church involvement in political affairs.  In 
reference to the helicopter incident, he had the following to say about Bishop Amfilohije, 
head Serbian Orthodox clergy in Montenegro, who has known Serb nationalist 
tendencies: 
[This] is preparation for a civil war.  It is quite clear…that the next image 
will be Amfilo
Kostunica and the Army.318 
By January 2006, the Serbian Orthodox Church launched its denunciation of Canak in a 
letter released from Patriarch Pavle’s office, claiming Canak was one of the perpetuators 
of hate speech against the Serbian Orthodox Church in Vojvodina.319  These Serbian 
Orthodox allegations of being victimized within Serbia were countered by critics, who 
noted the Church “is not exposed to hate speech, unless this term encompasses occasional 
ements critical of the Church.”320  Another critic discounted other allegations of 
discrimination against the Serbian Orthodox Church claimed by the Serbian governme
The Serbian minister of religion claimed the Serbian Orthodox Church “is the mos
frequently attacked religious organisation, verbally and physically;” this allegation se                                                 
316 Patrick Moore, “Serbia and Montenegro: the Politics of Churches and Helicopters,” Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty, 5 August 2005, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/08/962276d0-0bfc-4d6d-
a2bc-4cbfb5268260.html (accessed 9 October 2005). 
317 Canak is the leader of the League of Social-Democrats of Vojvodina. 
318 N. Calukovic, "Serbia Will Go to War Against Montenegro," Belgrade Blic, 15 August 2005.  
Translated from Serbian by FBIS.  Available from FBIS. 
319 Miroslav Zadrepko, “Serbian Church Claims Victim Status,” Balkan Investigative Reporting 
Network: Balkan Insight, no. 17, 20 January 2006.  Available at 
http://www.birn.eu.com/insight_17_5_eng.php.  Accessed 24 April 2006. 
320 The Serbian Orthodox Church also pointed out acts of vandalism against its churches, which had 
alrea  
92, 23 January 2006.  Available from FBIS. 
dy been resolved at the time of the letter.  See “Vojvodina Analysts Deny Serbian Orthodox Church is
Under Attack in Province,” Belgrade Radio B
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 acknowledged, including Sabrina Ramet, the Serbian Orthodox Church is 
interna ing to 
occur.3
 
                                                
ludicrous considering the more frequent attacks on other religions.321  It appears the 
allegations of attacks against the Serbian Orthodox Church in Vojvodina were a way to 
discredit the efforts of those politicians seeking more regional autonomy from the central 
government.322 
The bonding actions by the Serbian Orthodox Church seem to obstruct the 
chances for it to positively affect society.  The examples cited above seem to fall into 
what Sabrina Ramet calls the “social creed” of Orthodox churches, which include the 
following: the state has a duty “to protect its Church and to advance its agenda;” harming 
“those who have sinned against the Church” is legitimate; and the idea that “there can be 
no equal rights for rival religious organizations.”323  This prognosis is bleak, but as many 
have already
lly pluralistic so there is room for other kinds of activity, including bridg
24 
C. BRIDGES 
Ongoing bridging activities between the Serbian Orthodox Church and other 
groups have occurred since 2000, just as they did during communism and during the wars 
in the 1990s.  The majority of the inter-communal reconciliation process has taken place 
at the inter-religious cleric level.  This is an important first step to creating cross-cutting 
networks within society.  The second step has been to put the words of reconciliation into 
action, through multi-confessional charity work as well as with secular entities. 
 
 
eir own church.  See Sonja Biserko, “Human Rights 
and rbia (Belgrade, 2004): 364, 
http:
321 “Vojvodina Analysts Deny Serbian Orthodox Church is Under Attack in Province.” 
322 The Church is opposed to more Vojvodinian autonomy since not only does this go against Serbian
“integration” but allegedly some Vojvodinians want th
Accountability, Serbia 2003,” Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Se
//www.helsinki.org.yu/doc/reports/eng/AnnualReport2003.pdf, (accessed 4 April 2006). 
erbia and Montenegro: 
vember 2005): 14, 
http
323 Sabrina Ramet, “The Politics of the Serbian Orthodox Church,” 275. 
324 For example, ideal forms of government advocated by Serbian Orthodox clergy range from 
monarchy to Christian democracy.  The Church has not adopted a specific platform.  See Nonka 
Bogomilova, “The Religious Situation in Contemporary Bulgaria, and in S
Differences and Similarities,” Religion in Eastern Europe XXV, no. 4 (No
://www.georgefox.edu/academics/undergrad/departments/soc-swk/ree/2005/bogomilova.pdf, (accessed
1 June 2006). 
See also Sabrina Ramet, “The Politics of the Serbian Orthodox Church,” 272. 
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ven today, there are quite a few influential Serbian Orthodox Church 
clergy 
lbanian lives during the 1999 crisis.  His erstwhile right-hand man, Father Sava 
Janjic, a voice for peace and probably the favorite cleric among Western players, has also 
ken a hard line on ecumenism in his 1995 book Ecumenism and the Time of 
 on ecumenism did not stop him from publicly apologizing to 
Kosovo Albanians in Novem
regretting 
that the “Church had been unable to prevent the tragic events” of the 1990s.329 
1. Religious Reconciliation Trends 
Religious ecumenism (inter-Christian dialogue) has had a spotty record 
throughout Serbian history and was often accomplished through individual efforts on 
both sides.325  E
who still advocate the teachings of prominent Serbian Orthodox Church 
theologian Justin Popovich (now saint), who claimed ecumenism as “a collective name 
for pseudo-Christianities [which] are nothing other than a collection of heresies.”326  The 
main concern these clergy hold against ecumenism is that the Orthodox faith would be 
corrupted through compromise on issues of their one true faith.  Nevertheless, even those 
who have been adamantly anti-ecumenical have still managed to build bridges with other 
groups outside the Orthodox faith.  For example, Bishop Artemije, who spoke 
vehemently against ecumenism at a conference in 2004, was a key factor in saving many 
Kosovo A
ta
Apostasy.327  His views
ber 1999, stating 
[I] express my greatest regret for everything which was done by members 
of the Serbian people and special forces against the Albanian civilians, 
which is a very serious crime.328 
In June 2005, Fr Sava repeated a similar apology for Serb behavior in the 1990s – even 
after Kosovo Albanians destroyed much Serbian Orthodox property in 2004 – 
                                                 
325 Vjekoslav Perica, Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), 15. 
326 Bishop Artemije of Raska and Prizren, “The Serbian Orthodox Church
nce on Ecumenism: Origins, Expectations, Disenchantment, Septembe
 vis-à-vis Ecumenism,” 
Confere r 2004, 
http://www.orthodoxinfo.com/ecumenism/artemije_thess.aspx (accessed 2 April 2006). 
327 “What the Church Can(not) be Asked About,” 16.  
Of interest, there has been a rift between Fr Sava and Bishop Artemije on approaching the Kosovo
final status talks.  See Maja Radojevic and Tanja Matic, “Church Split Over Question of Dialogue,” Balkan 
Insight, no. 37, 1 June 2006, 
 
http://www.birn.eu.com/insight_37_3_eng.php (accessed 1 June 2006). 
328 Sabrina Ramet, “The Politics of the Serbian Orthodox Church,” 262. 
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in the Serbian Orthodox Church, there 
have re
imes seems to be under dispute.  
Despite an anti-ecumenical tendency with
cently been enormous steps taken to reconcile tensions with the Catholic Church, 
whose faithful constitute the largest Christian minority in Serbia or about four percent of 
the population.330  This is not to imply that the two religions will necessarily resolve their 
theological and doctrinal differences, but just getting beyond past animosity would be a 
revolutionary step in facing the past and progressing towards a more charitable 
relationship.331  This rapprochement has been occurring over the past few years.  In 2000, 
Catholic bishops from the EU and Serbian Orthodox bishops gathered in Belgrade to call 
for an end of the trade embargo against Yugoslavia, as well as discuss common points of 
interest, such as increasing cooperation on charity work and exchanges.332  By 2003, 
relations had warmed up enough for a delegation of high level Serbian Orthodox Church 
bishops, including nationalist-leaning Metropolitan Amfilohije, to meet with Pope John 
Paul II at the Vatican.  This was further confirmation of warming relations between the 
two churches as each espoused a common interest – the defense of Christian values 
within an increasingly secular Europe.  John Paul addressed the Serbian delegation in its 
own language: 
The Christian identity of Europe…somet
This can only force us to seek and promote every form of collaboration 
that enables Orthodox and Catholics to join in giving a vivid and 
convincing testimony of their common tradition.333 
                                                 
329 “Serbian Orthodox Church Official Offers Apology to Kosovo Albanians,” Southeast European 
Times, 19 June 2005, 
http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/document/setimes/newsbriefs/2005/06/19/nb-03 
(accessed 6 April 2006). 
330 The Muslims are the largest religious minority constituting about 19 percent of the population.  See 
U.S. State Department, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, “Background Note: Serbia and 
Montenegro,” (Washington, D.C., December 2005), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5388.htm (accessed 
25 A
es from those Serbian Orthodox who think that there is some room for 
ecum  to 
 Can(not) be Asked 
goslavian Embargo,” ZENIT News Agency, 20 
July
pril 2006). 
331 This movement com
enical relations with Catholics (and maybe other traditional Christian faiths), though extending this
other religions, especially small Protestant sects is unthinkable.  See “What the Church
About,” 17. 
332 “Catholic and Orthodox Bishops Call for End to Yu
 2000, http://www.zenit.org/english/archive/0007/ZE000720.html (accessed 25 April 2006). 
333 Pope John Paul II, “The Spirit is Guiding the Church toward Full Unity,” L'Osservatore Romano, 




and numerous Serbian Orthodox sites of worship (see Chapter III).  
Severa nteenth 
century intervene, 
but nat ob and pled with 
firefighters to save what they could.  The firefighters heeded his words and the mosque, 
though severely damaged, was not completely destroyed.  Amfilohije was later thanked 
      
rbs reacted warmly to the pope’s outreach and Metropolitan Amfilohije stated this 
visit showed the “real improvement in relations with the Catholic Church.”334  This was 
evidenced by Patriarch Pavle’s discussions with European Roman Catholic bishops in 
June 2004.  Their joint statement proclaimed that Catholic-Orthodox interaction would 
further “the real spiritual unification of Europe.”335  Pope Benedict XVI has carried on 
the dialogue with the Serbian Orthodox Church, prioritizing Serbia as his first visit to an 
Orthodox country, followed by Russia.336  The Holy Synod of the Serbian Orthodox 
Church would need to agree to this kind of visit (due to the horizontal structure of the 
Church).  Whereas this kind of visit would have been unthinkable a year ago, more 
bishops are now for the pope’s visit; the majority of Serbian people would also welcome 
such a visit.337 
The Serbian Orthodox Church has not limited itself to building bridges with 
fellow Christians.  On several occasions, the Serbian Orthodox Church has supported the 
Muslims and Jewish communities after they have been attacked.  The most poignant 
intervention occurred right after the March 2004 Kosovo Albanian violence against 
Kosovo Serbs 
l young Serbians rioted in Belgrade as a reaction, setting fire to the seve
 Bajrakli mosque.338  The Serb police and firefighters were too afraid to 
ionalist-leaning Metropolitan Amfilohije broke through the m
                                           
334 Jonathan Luxm
Orthodox World (April 2003): 31.  Initially printed in ENI Bulletin, no. 3, 19 February 2003, 
oore, “Serbian Orthodox Church Takes Further Step in Contacts with Vatican,” The 
/wordhtml/200304_31.htmlhttp://www.antiochian.org  (accessed 25 April 2006). 
2004/06
335 “Serbian Orthodox Church Pledges Closer Ties with Roman Catholics” Ecumenical News 
International ENI-04-0383, 22 June 2004.  Available at http://www.eni.ch/highlights/news.shtml? .  
 Patrick Melady, “Viewpoint: A Papal Visit to Serbia is Historic Opportunity,” National 
Cath
Accessed 25 April 2006. 
336 Thomas
olic Reporter, 24 February 2006, 
http://ncronline.org/NCR_Online/archives2/2006a/022406/022406v.htm (accessed 6 April 2006). 
337 The main sticking points for Serbian Orthodox include the unresolved issues of the WWII Ustaša 
regime and its Jasenovac concentration camp.  See “Commentary: Number of Bishops of SPC Against 
Pope’s Visit Constantly Decreasing,” Forum for South-Eastern Europe, 30 September 2005, 
http://balkansecurity.com/news/index.php?l+en&id=127380&q=search.txt (accessed 8 April 2006). 
ww.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=280
338 Felix Corley and Branko Bjelajac, “Kosovo & Serbia: Churches & Mosques Destroyed Amid 
Inter-Ethnic Violence,” Forum 18 News Service, 18 March 2004, 
http://w  (accessed 26 April 2006). 
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 Serbian Orthodox Church has denounced the increasing anti-Semitic 
trend in
      
by Muslim leaders for his actions.339  Furthermore, members of the Serbian Orthodox 
Church including Patriarch Pavle, joined Serbian government sponsored marches to call 
for a return to calm in the streets; the peaceful demonstrations seemed to diffuse the 
volatile situation.340  A more recent example of expressing solidarity with the Muslims 
was in the February 2006 controversy over the re-publishing of the Danish Muhammad 
cartoons.  Serbian Orthodox Bishop Irinej, rumored to be on the short list to succeed 
Patriarch Pavle (along with Metropolitan Amfilohije), strongly condemned those 
European dailies which had republished the cartoons, stating “the feelings of every 
believing person have been hurt, as well as those of every civilized person…ready to 
respect another person's religious feelings and convictions.”341  As for the Jewish 
community, the
 Serbia.342  An official statement by the Serbian Orthodox Church’s Holy Synod 
in March 2005 made it clear the rising anti-Semitism was unacceptable from every 
aspect.343  These kinds of supportive statements for Jews and Muslims are only the first 
steps to easing tensions between religious groups, but they are hopeful indicators. 
Besides the numerous formal declarations by various church leaders, there have 
been multiple efforts to formalize the process of reconciliation between the different 
religious groups.  One example is the establishment of the Inter-Religious Center in 
Belgrade in Spring 2000, just prior to Milošević’s departure from power.  This center 
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rade.  See International Crisis Group, “Europe Report no. 154: Serbia’s U-Turn,” (26 March 20
341 “Serbian Orthodox Church Condemns Muhammad Cartoons,” Belgrade FoNet, 14 February 2006.  
Translated from Serbian b
342 As with all matters, this issue is complicated since some of the anti-Semitic activity has been 
linked to groups with alleged ties to the Serbian Orthodox Church.  See Helsinki Committee for Hu
Rights in Serbia, “The Serbian Orthodox Church and the New Serbian Identity” (Belgrade, 2006): 
See also “Serbia and Montenegro (includes Kosovo)” in Annual Report on International Religious 
Freedom 2005. 
343 The Holy Synod’s statement: “Once again, as we have done in previous years, we most strongl
condemn every form and every manifestation of anti-Semitism…This phenomenon is unacceptable 
logically, morally, on the grounds of civilisation and in every other respect.” See “Serbian Orthodo
Church Condemns Anti-Semitism,” Ecumenical News Internation




aims to train religious personnel to mitigate social tensions within Serbian society.344  
The Serbian Orthodox Church has also been a participant in this center, whose stated 
mission is “to replace hostility with cooperation and respect.”345 
2. Charitable Work 
In addition to the religious reconciliation efforts, the Serbian Orthodox Church 
has joined forces with religious and secular NGOs, as well as foreign government-
sponsored organizations to develop civil society.  The principal method has been to work 
through joint charitable actions.  Philanthropy, the Serbian Orthodox Church’s official 
charity, has been the foremost Serbian Orthodox actor, interacting with many different 
NGOs and government organizations, including some from the US.346  Philanthropy 
started in 1992, amidst the Balkan wars and professes to be non-discriminatory in regards 
to background in providing aid (religion included).  Its stated interests vary but include 
the development of civil society.347  Efforts have included such projects as providing 
medical/food assistance to the poor in Serbian cities, assistance to internally displaced 
persons and refugees in Serbia and agriculturally-based projects in Kosovo. Near
 has been accomplished in conjunction with either a foreign government (like the 
US or Greece) or with a NGO (like Catholic Caritas or German Lutheran Diakonisches 
                                                 
344 The center aims to train people “in conflict resolution, reconciliation and peace-building.”  See 
Tsjeard Bouta, S. Ayse Kadayifci-Orellana and Mohammed Abu-Nimer, “Faith-Based Peace Building: 
Mapping and Analysis of Christian, Muslim and Multi-Faith Actors,” Netherlands Institute of International 
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345 “Representatives of Interreligious Centre Visit Patriarch Pavle,” Hobocth News (Information 
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See also United States Institute of Peace: The Balkans Initiative, “Rule of Law and Interreligious 




es - USA); UMCOR (United Methodist committee on relief - USA; WCC (World Council 
of C
346 According to the Philanthropy website, these include the following partnerships: ACT (Action
Churches Together); ACT Netherlands; BPRM (Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration - US 
Government); Caritas Vienna; Caritas Austria, CRS (Catholic Relief Service - USA); CEC (Conference 
pean Churches); Diakonisches Werk (Germany); Intersos (Italy); IOCC (International Orthodox 
Christian Chariti
hurches).  For more information, see Philanthropy website, http://www.covekoljublje.org/about.htm 
(accessed 27 April 2006). 
347 Goals include: “distribution of food and non-food items, distribution of medicine, medical supplie
and medical equipment, providing medical examinations and psycho-social counseling, food produc




rsumlija (just north of 
Kosovo 9  A f the efforts were geared toward taking care of Serb 
refugee
religious backgrounds.  This is like what has happened in Kosovo with the Kosovo Serbs, 
where the taken action is bonding, but the coordinating action is bridging.  One such 
by 
r Serbian 
Werk).348  Two examples illustrate the inter-religious cooperation.  First, in 2000, 
Philanthropy worked with other faith-based NGOs to provide over a 1000 meals per day 
at a soup kitchen in Kragujevac (south of Belgrade) and Ku
).34 t that time, most o
s from Kosovo.  Second, in 2006, the NGO Action by Churches Together 
provided funds to Philanthropy to assist villages in northeast Serbia affected by the 
flooding with such items as potable water.  This area, the Banat region in Vojvodina, is 
ethnically diverse and has a significant Hungarian minority.350 
Not all of the Serbian Orthodox Church’s charitable work has been done with 
fellow Christians or for other religious groups.  In 2001-2002 timeframe, the Serbian 
Orthodox Church worked with the US government (Bureau for Population, Refugees and 
Migration) and another faith-based NGO to help mitigate the persistent issue of Kosovo 
Serb refugees.  Philanthropy trained these refugees to gain basic work skills and to build 
greenhouses so they could grow their own food.  In exchange, the refugees agreed to 
provide 25 percent of their harvest to local soup kitchens (with the food going to an 
estimated 1500 needy people).351  Some charitable action has been geared explicitly 
towards Serbian Orthodox laity but has nevertheless funded by NGOs of different 
example is the Pastoral Counseling Center, started in 2000 and primarily sponsored 
three different Christian-based NGOs (Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox).352  This 
center is a fusion of psychological assistance with a spiritual emphasis fo
                                                 
348 For more details on the projects, see Philanthropy website, 
http://www.covekoljublje.org/proj_completed.htm and http://www.covekoljublje.org/proj_current.htm, 
(accessed 27 April 2006). 
349 “ACT Sitrep Balkans Appeal EUBK01,” no. 4/00, Action by Churches Together website, 13 
March 2000, http://www.reliefwebint/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/ACOS-64C9ZW?OpenDocument 
(accessed 27 April 2006). 
350 “ACT News Update: East Europe-ACT Members Respond to Floods,” Action by Churches 
Together website, 24 April 2006, http://www.reliefwebint/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/ABES-
6P6MF3?OpenDocument (accessed 27 April 2006). 
351 Philanthropy website. 
352 Ibid. 
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actors seem dead set against the Serbian Orthodox Church and seem to go out of their 
way to portray the Church as only a reactionary and negative force within Serbian 
soc  Church never protested against 
alm  
            
Orthodox laity.  It trains psychology and theology students to work out in the field.  The 
center also provides psychological treatment (4370 patients were treated in 2004).353 
Though sporadic, the Serbian Orthodox Church has joined forces with other 
groups to build inter-ethnic bridges within society.  For example, Catholic Pax Christi 
Nederland (a foreign NGO), the Serbian government, and the Serbian Orthodox Church 
have worked together on tackling some ethnic/religious issues.  In November 2004, all 
three entities met to deal with rising ethnic tension in Vojvodina, where young thugs had 
stirred up trouble.354 
The examples mentioned above are but a sampling of charitable activity in which 
the Serbian Orthodox Church is a joint partner.  Considering the Serbian Orthodox 
Church did not have any systematic way of conducting charitable work before 1992, its 
efforts have grown tremendously, especially in coordination with other religious NGOs, 
the Serbian government and foreign government based institutions.  Though more could 
be done to bridge at the grass-roots level to other ethnic groups within Serbia, it has 
bridged effectively at the administrative level with other religious groups.  Additionally, 
every morsel of bread handed out at a soup kitchen, every seed planted, and every trained 
worker will lead to a more stable and confident Serbian society. 
 
D. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
When it comes to the Serbian Orthodox Church and the kind of influence it 
maintains over the Serbian society, the opinions are often completely polarized.  Some 
iety.  For instance, the oft quoted allegations that the
the Milošević regime or that it only waited until 1999 to do so are simply not true but are 
ost accepted as gospel truth by the West.  On the other side, the actors associated with
                                     
353 For more details, see the Orthodox Pastoral Counseling Center of the Belgrade-Karlovci 
Archdiocese website, http://www.ppsc.spc.yu/Misija/aktuelnosti.php?j=e (accessed 27 April 2006).   
See also Philanthropy website. 
354 Pax Christi Nederland - Bal
ltiethnic Cooperation on
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nipotent and evil organization portrayed in certain circles.  The 
Church does not have an iron grip on controlling the entire Serbian political scene or 
society, nor does it necessarily desire that ki
mocracy.  For example, 
the recently passed law on religion was over five years in the making.  The earlier drafts 
called for a minimum of 700 signatures to register a religious organization (which would 
ke it m but the latest public 
draft required only 75 petitioners.
     
the Serbian Orthodox Church do not address the uncomfortable reality that certain clergy 
and church leaders supported the activities of the Serbian government and its partners,
 of the Bosnian Serb and Croatian Serb factions.  These actors either ignore proof 
of Serbian aggression (and their clerics’ approval of it), or when pressed, will quickly 
point out that the West has cast Serbia as the pariah, ignoring the Serbs’ ongoing 
suffering in Kosovo at the hands of aggressive Kosovo Albanians.  There is truth in each 
side’s allegations, but one conclusion is clear from the evidence – the Serbian Orthodox 
Church is not the om
nd of power.  This lesser power is also due 
partially to the pluralism found within the Serbian Orthodox Church as well as pluralism 
within the Serbian government and society. 
What does pluralism within the Serbian Orthodox Church mean to Serbian civil 
society?  First, it should be recognized that the Church is not as powerful politically as 
some would portray it.  The Serbian Orthodox Church cannot lobby the Serbian 
parliament to pass its sponsored legislation without incurring changes.  The Church must 
accept the fact that compromises will be made, just as in any de
ma ore difficult for smaller religions to become legalized), 
355  Also, though the law regulating religion is far from 
perfect, it will provide some legal order in what has become a chaotic situation for 
religions.  Even when laws are passed which should benefit the Serbian Orthodox 
Church, unintended consequences have popped up.  This is evident in the assessment of 
religious education in public school, which has produced mixed results.  It has provided a 
venue for the Serbian Orthodox Church to teach its faith to a captive audience but the 
religious education program was so rushed in 2001 that it was poorly organized, with 
                                            
355 Djenovic, “Serbia: Almost No one Satisfied as Religion Bill Reaches Parliament.”   
See also Bjelajac, “Serbia: Orthodox Veto on New Religion Law?” 
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unqualified teachers and uninterested students.356  Ironically, the highest student 
enrollment percentages in religious education classes have actually occurred in Muslim-
heavy districts (reaching 80-100 percent); overall, enrollment of all Serbian students in 
religious education hovers around 50 percent.357  Since the preponderance of religious 
education teachers are Serbian Orthodox (1200 out of 1500), one can draw the conclusion 
that many Serbian Orthodox children have opted to take the civics education class over 
religious education.358  Finally, critics should take comfort in the fact that religious 
groups examine the other religions’ textbooks for signs of religious intolerance.359  Of 
course, only time will demonstrate the extent of Serbian Orthodox Church’s influence (or 
non-influence) over today’s children as they reach adulthood, but to date, it does not 
appear that this program “has led to any recorded serious problems or inter-confessional 
disputes.”360 
The Serbian Orthodox Church is also not omnipotent in influencing the quotidian 
decisions of society, especially when it comes to enforcing Church regulations.  Part of 
this reason might be because even though about ninety-five percent of Serbs affiliate 
themselves with Serbian Orthodoxy, religiosity hovers around twenty-two percent and 
only about seven percent are regular church attendees (in 2004).361  An example of the 
on-going struggle against the society’s secularization is the so-called sausage incident of 
2004.  Certain Serbian Orthodox Church leaders threatened local villagers with religious 
consequences when they held their sausage festival during the Lent fast.  These threats 
included denying religious services (e.g., baptism, marriages) to those participants in the 
                                                 
356 The Serbian Orthodox diocese in Belgrade is probably the exception, with a training program as 
well as education standards for its instructors.  In the rural areas, the Orthodox priests provide the religious 
education but do not necessarily have the training.  See Aleksov, “Religious Education in Serbia,” 345-347. 
357 Truancy runs high in these classes – sometimes as high as 80 percent!  See Ibid., 352-353. 
358 Aleksov, “Religious Education in Serbia,” 345. 
359 Ibid., 348. 
360 Ibid., 355. 
361 Vesna Peric Zimonjic, “Religion-Serbia: Church Takes on a Sausage,” Inter Press Service Asia 
Pacific, no. 41, 19 March 2004, cached text at http://www.ipsnews.co.th/anmviewer.asp?a=1396 (accessed 
27 April 2006). 
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ung people (and other Serbs) think atheism is undesirable.366  Second, the 
Serbian
                                                
sausage festival.362  In any case, the festival was well attended, with one event organizer 
quipping it did not seem that those who “ate the sausage cared much about 
excommunication.”363  These kinds of issues have critics asking first, why there has not 
been excommunication of war criminals (from the 1990s wars) and second, why the 
Church has not considered social issues like poverty, human trafficking or any number of 
issues as more important than society’s de-secularization.364 
While there is no reason to be alarmist about the Serbian Orthodox Church’s 
current influence in society, certain bonding trends are increasing.  First, it appears the 
Serbian Orthodox Church is making more inroads with young people as more of them 
accept Serbian Orthodox teachings in such issues as abortion; a rising number of young 
women think abortion is wrong, as opposed to the middle-aged and older women.365  
Also, more yo
 Orthodox Church appears to be extremely sensitive to critiques of the Church, 
including any calls for reform.  Lay Serbian Orthodox theologian Mirko Djordjevic, a 
critic of the Serbian Orthodox Church’s current direction, has stated that the old 
Orthodox paradigm advocating “a narrow collaboration between secular and spiritual 
power” is sorely outdated and that the Church should rather focus on evangelization.367  
As a result, Djordjevic has been branded a closet communist by nationalist leaning 
Serbian Orthodox Bishop Atanasije; Atanasije claimed “those who are not nationalist 
 
362 Bishop Irinej of Backa wrote a letter stating that the villagers should defend “the sanctity of the 
fasting and protect the faith and tradition of our honorable ancestors.”  See Sonja Biserko, “Human Rights 
and Collective Identity, Serbia 2004,” Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia (Belgrade, 2005): 
70, http://www.helsinki.org.yu/doc/reports/eng/AnnualReport2004.pdf, (accessed 4 April 2006). 
 in Serbia.” 
lled, “25% does [sic] not want atheists to educate their children.”  See “What the 
Chur  Asked About,”19. 
lt Dérens,  “Eglise Orthodoxe Serbe: "Je Suis un Dissident!" - Entretien avec Mirko 
Djor
363 Zimonjic, “Religion-Serbia: Church Takes on a Sausage.” 
364 “What the Church Can(not) be Asked About,” 12. 
See also Zimonjic, “Religion-Serbia: Church Takes on a Sausage.” 
365 “Serbia and Montenegro: Ethnic Fundamentalism
366 Of Serbs po
ch Can(not) be
367 Jean-Arnau
djevic,” Religioscope,  13 October 2004, http://religion.info/french/entretiens/article_105.shtml 
(accessed 26 July 2005). 
See also Bjelajac, “Serbia: Religious Freedom Survey, August 2004.” 
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overall Serbian society but 
Euro-A
      
have betrayed their people.”368  Third, related to the second observation, the Serbian 
Orthodox Church seems to be trying to close the pluralist trends within its ranks, 
including restructuring the Orthodox churches in the Vojvodina region to reflect a more 
traditional Byzantine architecture.369  Finally, the candidates rumored to replace Patriarch 
Pavle are reputedly nationalist and traditionalist in their outlook.  These trends will not 
necessarily translate directly into negative impacts on the 
tlantic institutions should encourage more of the bridging activity previously 
discussed.  A more inclusive attitude will take longer to develop but, in the end, will be 
the best for Serbian society. 
                                           
368 Stasa Zajovic, “Serbia and Montenegro: Religious Fundamentalism - the Birth Rate and 
Reproductive Rights,” Women Living under Muslim Laws website, 17 July 2004, 
http://www.wluml.org/english/newsfulltxt.shtml?cmd%5B157%5D=x-157-60785 (accessed 30 April 
2006). 
369 Biserko, “Human Rights and Accountability, Serbia 2003,” 364. 
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— Fr. Irinej Dobrijevic, U.S. House Committee on International 
      Relations, Kosovo: Current and Future Status, 18 May 2005 
The words of Father Dobrijevic encapsulate the attitude of many within the 
Serbian Orthodox Church – that the Church is the crucial component of Serbian society.  
As shown in this study, while this goal has definitely been pursued through various 
actions in the political realm as well as within civil society, the Church does not have 
nearly the influence over society it wishes it had.  It nevertheless is an important part of 
Serbian society and can act as the tipping point on certain issues – Kosovo certainly 
comes to mind.  The question this study has examined is if the behavior of the Serbian 
Orthodox Church has been bonding or bridging within society.  Before responding in the 
affirmative on either choice, one should consider the trap of reductionism. 
It is impossible to have an accurate or holistic understanding of an issue if one 
reduces people down to a certain set of perceived collective traits.  The Serbian Orthodox 
Church, which might seem to be a unitary bloc, is bound to be as multi-faceted and 
complex as any organization run by humans.  Sometimes a cleric who will exhibit 
bridging tendencies in one instance might be quoted as a bonding nationalist in the next.  
The same seemed to be true for the Catholic Church in Croatia, the Russian Orthodox 
Church and the Serbian Orthodox Church.  Given these complexities, one should avoid 
the temptation to conflate the entire Serbian Orthodox Church into one camp or another.  
Thi s of the 
y of 
ication – for the West, Serbs as rabid nationalists and for certain Church hierarchy, 
V. CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE SERBIAN ORTHODOX 
CHURCH AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 
A. SERBIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH: BONDING OR BRIDGING? 
The Serbian Orthodox Church has survived institutionally as it transcends 
governments, politics and mere geography, and is identified with the 
social and spiritual conditions of its people. The Church is not only the 
repository and guardian of Orthodox Christianity; it is also uniquely 
situated as the patron and protector of the Serbian people and their rich, 
world-class cultural and spiritual heritage. 
s consideration is directed especially to the West but also to certain strand
Serbian Orthodox Church.  These entities tend to dump all Serbs into one categor
identif
86 
Serbs as  
ignores the fact tha or instance, 
Serb/Orthodox/Democrat/Europeanist or Serb/atheist/nationalist/anti-EU or 
ination of 
any num letely 
bondin  Each 
tendenc ding.  
This bo  form 
bridges and create stabilizing networks within Serbian civil society.  Certain elements of 
the Church, lik of society 
(like taking care of the 
spirit of avoiding reductionism, this study will conclude with some thoughts for all sides 
to cons
 Serbian Orthodox.  This kind of reductionism, known as “singular affiliation”
t individuals can have several kinds of identity; f
Serb/Catholic/apolitical.370  Each citizen of Serbia is a slightly different comb
ber of issues.  One cannot claim that its members and leadership are comp
g or completely bridging with respect to other religious and ethnic groups. 
y exists, though within the Serbian Orthodox Church, most strands are bon
nding tendency is not a reason to give up hope on the Church’s potential to
e Philanthropy, are already positively affecting certain aspects 
poor) and collaborating with other religious groups in so doing.  
The Church’s charity work has come a long way from the early 1990s, before it had a 
systemic approach.  Finally, as Serbia becomes further integrated into the Euro-Atlantic 
institutions, the experiences of Serbian Orthodox faithful in more pluralist societies could 
very well lead to more bridging activities and attitudes within the Church itself.  The final 
verdict has thus not been cast for the Serbian Orthodox Church.  Though trending heavily 
towards bonding behavior, the bridging framework currently being developed by 
elements within the Church and its partners should offer a ray of hope for those 
monitoring Serbia’s development into a secure and stable democracy.371  Finally, in the 
ider. 
 
B. CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE SERBIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH 
The Serbian Orthodox Church is a self-governing actor – it is not the West’s place 
to tell it what to do – but there are some items it could take into consideration.  First, for 
those bonding elements within the Serbian Orthodox Church which are afraid of losing 
Serbian identity, should Serbia ascend to the EU, Serbia’s accession might actually open 
some doors for the Church.  Features of the EU such as the Schengen Accords (which 
                                                 
370 “Singular affiliation” is “assuming that any person preeminently belongs…to one collectivity 
only.”  See Amartya Sen, Identity and Violence: the Illusion of Destiny (New York and London: W.W. 
Norton & Company, 2006), 20, 23-28. 
371 Thanks to Tara Leweling for this idea. 
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rtugal, Spain, Ireland, and Luxemburg) or large Catholic 
minorities (Germany) have blocked an EU-wide law regulating embryonic stem cell 
eded in 
convin
provides for the free movement of EU citizens) would allow the Serbian Orthodox 
Church to minister to its people more efficiently.  Of course the Church will have to also 
consider that the EU will expect it to “obey” EU laws, which does not sit well with many 
clergy (the tone of the EU is perceived as condescending).372  Second, as the Serbian 
Orthodox Church finds its place within this new reality, expanding partnerships with 
organizations like the International Orthodox Christian Charities can help the Serbian 
Orthodox Church develop more ties with the rest of the world, within the safety of being 
among Orthodox.373  Third, bonding elements within the Serbian Orthodox Church 
should recognize the reality that Serbia is and will remain a pluralist society.  This reality 
does not take away from any of the historical and cultural roles the Church has had 
throughout the years.  This reality also does not diminish the role the spiritual message 
the Church may have for its adherents or the role it can play in advocating social justice 
on the behalf of all Serbians, Orthodox or not. 
 
C. CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE EU 
The largely secular EU is suspicious of countries in which religious forces appear 
to impose themselves on the public sphere, as in the Serbian case.  These activities are 
nonetheless bound to be a factor within social and political issues, no matter how secular 
the society.  Ignoring the reality of a church’s or religious group’s influence will not 
make the issues go away.  For example, pro-life movements within countries with 
Catholic majorities (Austria, Po
research.374  In June 2005, the Vatican and the Catholic Church in Italy succe
cing citizens to abstain from voting, thereby defeating a referendum on artificial 
                                                 
372 Sonja Biserko, “Human Rights and Collective Identity, Serbia 2004,” Helsinki Committee for 
Human Rights in Serbia (Belgrade, 2005): 58. 
373 The IOCC, established in 1992 professes its mission does not include direct proselytization or 
aiding the Orthodox internal activities but is geared solely towards the poor.  See “Mission and Focus,” 
International Orthodox Christian Charities website, http://www.iocc.org/aboutiocc_mission.shtml (acce
30 January 2006). 
374 “EU Policy on Embryonic Stem
ssed 
 Cells,” International Right to Life Federation, Inc. 17, no. 2 
(Ma ternational/2006/v17no2.htmrch/April 2006), http://www.lifeissues.org/in  (accessed 1 May 2006). 
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urch-state-society relationships are more 
omplicated in these countries than in non-Orthodox countries, due to the Orthodox 
ed, this does not mean that Orthodoxy is 
automa
fertilization.375  It has been reported that Pope Benedict XVI’s goal is to save Europe 
from itself, with its growing demographic issues and increased secularization.376  Until 
2002, the Greeks mandated religious affiliation on national identification cards; when it 
was deemed unconstitutional, the Greek Orthodox Church vehemently protested.377  
Finally, quite a few of the EU member states have either official churches or financially 
subsidize them.378  Even France, the only EU country completely secularized, has 
increased its dialogue with the Catholic Church, with top French officials meeting with 
Church leaders on a regular basis since 2002.379  While at times the EU seems to be on a 
social engineering mission to shape the civil societies of its aspiring members by setting 
strict entry conditions, its own church-state-society issues are still unresolved. 
As such, the EU should be sensitive to the fact that its aspirants will not be 
completely secularized when they join the union.  This is especially true as more 
Orthodox states enter the EU fold.  The ch
c
tradition of Caesaropapism.  As has been stat
tically counter to democracy but each Orthodox nation has its historical legacy to 
consider.  This continued interaction between church and state is reflected by a Russian 
Orthodox bishop, advising his fellow Orthodox in other countries to 
                                                 
375 Ian Fisher, “Italian Vote to Ease Fertility Law Fails for Want of Voters,” New York Times, 14 June 
2005, A.11.  Available from ProQuest. 
376 “Pope's Goal Nothing Less than Saving Europe” Philadelphia Inquirer, 5 March 2006, D01.  
Available fr m LexisNexis. 
377 David W. Hendon and Donald E. Greco, “Notes on Church-State Affairs,” Journal of Church and 
o
State 44, no. 1 (Winter 2002), http://www3.baylor.edu/Church_State/journ2002Winter.html (accessed 1 
May 2006). 
378 As examples, Malta, Greece, Denmark and the UK all have official state religions; Finland has 
two d 
ary 
ry Studies” (Washington, D.C., n.d.), 
http
.  The Austrian, German and Spanish governments currently do support or have financially supporte
their registered churches.  Lithuania and Poland have religious education in their schools.  See U.S. Libr
of Congress: Federal Research Division, “Count
://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/ (accessed 1 May 2006). 
See also Robert J. Barro and Rachel M. McCleary, “Which Countries Have State Religions?” The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics CXX, no. 4 (November 2005): 1336-1339. 
379 “Instance de Dialogue entre le Gouvernement et l’Eglise Catholique,” Government of France 
website, 21 December 2006, http://www.premier-ministre.gouv.fr/acteurs/communiques_4/instance-




     
actively participate now in the dialogue with European political 
structures…to prevent the monopoly of one world-view [e.g., 
secularization] which might dictate its conditions to all residents of the 
EU.380 
The EU will try to balance respecting future members’ cultures and needs, but it 
needs to recognize that developing a viable pluralist civil society will be a long, hard 
journey for both sides.  It should also recognize that if it acts condescendingly to such 
institutions like the Serbian Orthodox Church, it could tip the balance even more strongly 
toward the bonding, anti-EU sections of the Church.  If, however, if it encourages the 
Church to continue its bridging work, through actions such as granting funds for charity 
work to all needy Serbian citizens and if the EU acknowledges the fact that t
y a role within Serbian identity for a long time to come, the extreme bonding 
elements’ claims could be mitigated.  This would increase the space for the more 
moderate and bridging elements within the Church to further develop.  These kinds of 
actions can ease the transition process of integrating countries like Serbia into the 
European Union and will be the best for Europe’s future security and well-being. 
 
                                            
380 Alfayev Hilarion, Russian Orthodox Church Bishop, “Orthodoxy in a New Europe: Problem
























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
91 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
“ACT News Update: East Europe-ACT Members Respond to Floods.”  Action by 
Churches Together website, 24 April 2006, 
http://www.reliefwebint/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/ABES-6P6MF3?OpenDocument 
(accessed 27 April 2006). 
“ACT Sitrep Balkans Appeal.” no. 4/00.  Action by Churches Together website, 13 
March 2000, http://www.reliefwebint/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/ACOS-
64C9ZW?OpenDocument (accessed 27 April 2006). 
“Address of His Holiness Serbian Patriarch Pavle on Behalf of the Holy Assembly of 
Bishops of the Serbian Orthodox Church Regarding Upcoming Negotiations on the 
Status of Kosovo and Metohija.”  Serbian Orthodox Church website, 4 November 
2005, http://www.spc.org.yu/Vesti-2005/11/04-11-05-e.html#add (accessed 8 
November 2005). 
Aleksov, Bojan.  “Religious Education in Serbia.”  Religion, State & Society 32, no. 4, 
December 2004. 
Anderson, Benedict.  Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism, 2d ed. (rev).  London and New York: Verso, 1991. 
Anderson, John.  Religions Liberty in Transitional Societies: The Politics of Religion.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
Artemije, Bishop of Raska and Prizren.  “The Serbian Orthodox Church vis-à-vis 
Ecumenism.”  In proceedings of Ecumenism: Origins, Expectations, Disenchantment 
(Thessaloniki, Greece, September 2004), 
http://www.orthodoxinfo.com/ecumenism/artemije_thess.aspx (accessed 2 April 
2006). 
U.S. Department of State: Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs.  “Background Note: 
Serbia and Montenegro.”  Washington DC, December 2005, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5388.htm (accessed 25 April 2006). 
Bajrusi, Robert.  “Bozanic Provokes a Rebellion of the Clergy.”  Zagreb Nacional, 29 
March 2005.  Translated from Croatian by FBIS.  Available from FBIS. 
Barro, Robert J. and Rachel M. McCleary, “Which Countries Have State Religions?”  
The Quarterly Journal of Economics CXX, no. 4 (November 2005): 1331-1370. 
Bežovan, Gojko, Siniša Zrinščak, and Marina Vugec.  “Civil Society in Croatia: Gaining 
Trust and Establishing Partnerships with the State and Other Stakeholders.”  
CIVICUS Civil Society Index Report for Croatia.  Zagreb, 2005. 
92 
Bežovan, Gojko.  “Utjecaj O rvatskoj.”  Sociological 
Review XXXIV, no. 3-4 (23 November 2003): 127-142, 
http://www.hsd.hr/revija/en/pdf/3-4-2003/01-organizacije-civilnog-drustva.pdf
rganizacija Civilnog Društva u H
 
Billi
Bise  and Accountability, Serbia 2003.”  Helsinki Committee 
(accessed 3 May 2006). 
ngton, James H.  The Icon and the Axe.  New York: Vintage Books, 1966. 
rko, Sonja.  “Human Rights




——. “Human Rights and Collective Identity, Serbia 2004.”  Helsinki Committee for 
Human Rights in Serbia.  Belgrade, 2005, 
http://www.helsinki.org.yu/doc/reports/eng/AnnualReport2004.pdf, (accessed 4 
April 2006). 
Bjelajac, Branko.  “Serbia: Orthodox Veto on New Religion Law?”  Forum 18 News, 16 
May 2005, http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=562 (accessed 9 
October 2005). 
——. “Serbia: Religious Freedom Survey, August 2004.”  Forum 18 News Service, 5 
August 2004, http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=387 (accessed 23 
April 2006). 
Blazevski, Ivan, and Zelimir Bojovic.  “Serbia ‘Financing’ Rival Macedonian Church.”
Balkan Investigative Reporting Network: Balkan
  
 Insight, no. 27 (24 March 2006), 
http://www.birn.eu.com/insight_27_1_eng.php (accessed 24 April 2006). 
omilova, Nonka.  “The Religious Situation in Contemporary Bulgaria, and in Serbia 
and Montenegro: Differences and Similarities.”  Religion in Eastern Europe XXV




swk/ree/2005/bogomilova.pdf, (accessed 1 June 2006). 
ta, Tsjeard, S. Ayse Kadayifci-Orellana, and Mohammed Abu-Nimer. 
Peace Building: Mapping and Analysis of Christian, Muslim and Mult
Bou  “Faith-Based 
i-Faith 
Actors.”  Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael and Salam 
Institute for Peace and Justice (Washington, D.C. and The Hague, November 2005), 
http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2005/20051100_cru_paper_faith-
based%20peace-building.pdf, (accessed 1 June 2006). 
hat Went Wrong?  Church-State Relations in Socialist Buchenau, Klaus.  “W
Yugoslavia.”  Nationalities Papers 33, no. 4 (December 2005): 547-567. 
93 
cauc
Catholic Relief Services.  “More Ethnic Fighting in Kosovo Leaves Thousands 
Homeless.”, n.d., 
http://www.crs.org/our_work/where_we_work/overseas/eastern_europe_&_the_




er, and the Struggle for Democracy in South-East Europe, edited by 
Corley, Felix, and Branko Bjelajac.  “Kosovo & Serbia: Churches & Mosques Destroyed 
Chapnin, Sergei.  “Frankly Speaking: The Income of the Russian Orthodox Chu
East-West Church & Ministry Report 9 (Winter 2001): 15-16. 
pnin, Sergei.  “The Orthodox Church’s Social Concept.”  Russia Profile II, no. 8 
(October 2005): 23-25. 
Clark, Victoria.  Why Angels Fall: a Journey through Orthodox Europe from Byzantium 
to Kosovo.  New York: St Martin’s Press, 2000. 
en, Lenard J.  “Embattled Democracy: Postcommunist Croatia in Transition.” In 
Politics, Pow
Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, 69-121.  Glasgow: Cambridge University Press, 
1997. 
Amid Inter-Ethnic Violence.”  Forum 18 News Service, 18 March 2004, 
http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=280, (accessed 26 April 2006). 
Dérens, Jean-Arnault.  “Eglise Orthodoxe Serbe: "Je Suis un Dissident!" - Entretien avec 
Mirko Djordjevic.” Religioscope,  13 October 2004, 
http://religion.info/french/entretiens/article_105.shtml (accessed 26 July 2005). 
etak, Silvo, Liana Kalčina, and Miroslav F. Polzer, eds.  “Legal Position ofDev  Churches 
and Religious Communities in South - Eastern Europe.”  Institute for Ethnic and 
Regional Studies.  Ljubljana-Maribor-Vienna, 2004, 
http://www.aso.zsi.at/attach/LegposreliginSEE.pdf (accessed 11 May 2006). 
ovic, Drasko.  “Serbia: Almost No one Satisfied as Religion Bill R
Parliament.”  Forum 18 News, 17 April 2006, 
Djen eaches 
http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=760 (accessed 23 April 2006). 
.  “Serbia: Religion Law Rushed through Parliament.”  Forum 18 News, 21 Ap
2006,  
—— ril 
http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=766 (accessed 23 April 
2006). 
es, Tomislav.  “Round-Table Discussion: Catholic ChuDom rch Influence on Sexual and 
Reproductive Rights and Health Policies.”  OneWorld, 6 March 2006, 
http://see.oneworld.net/article/view/128838/1/ (accessed 24 March 2006). 
“Ellis, Jane.  The Russian Orthodox Church: A Contemporary History.  Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1986. 
94 
itizen 
the Rise of Civil Society, edited by John Burbidge, 275-281.  New 
“EU Policy on Embryonic Stem Cells.”  International Right to Life Federation, Inc. 17, 
Epps, John.  “Core Values of Civil Society.”  In Beyond Prince and Merchant: C
Participation and 
York and Brussels: Institute of Cultural Affairs International, July 1997. 
no. 2 (March/April 2006), http://www.lifeissues.org/international/2006/v17no2.htm 
 the 
ports/eng/Studija-Kupres-eng.pdf
(accessed 1 May 2006). 
Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia.  “The Serbian Orthodox Church and
New Serbian Identity.”  Belgrade, 2006, 
http://www.helsinki.org.yu/doc/re , 2 June 2006. 
Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia.  “What the Church Can(not) be Asked 
About: The Serbian Orthodox Church, State and Society in Serbia.”  Belgrade, 2005, 
http://www.helsinki.org.yu/doc/reports/eng/Studija-Vukomanovic-eng.pdf (acces
4 April 2006). 
Report no. 141: Serbia after Djindjic.”   
Belgrade/Brussels, 18 March 2003.   
sed 
International Crisis Group. “Balkans 
Fagan, Geraldine.  “Russia: Ort
International Crisis Group. “Europe Report no. 154: Serbia’s U-Turn.”  
Belgrade/Brussels, 26 March 2004. 
International Crisis Group.  “Europe Report no. 170: Kosovo: the Challenge of 
Transition,” 17 February 2006. 
hodox becoming First among Equals.”  Forum 18, 27 
May 2003, http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=64 (accessed 9 October 
2005). 
ner, Ernest.  Nations and Nationalism.  Ithaca and London: Cornell University
1983. 
Gell  Press, 
0.  
 
Gvosdev, Nikolas K.  “Unity in Diversity: Civil Society, Democracy, and Orthodoxy in 
Contemporary Russia.” In Burden or Blessing?  Russian Orthodoxy and the 
Construction of Civil Society and Democracy, edited by Christopher Marsh, 25-3
Brookline, Massachusetts: Institute on Culture, Religion and World Affairs Boston
University, 2004, http://www3.baylor.edu/Church_State/orthodoxy1.html (accesse
16 May 2006). 
d 
Hendon, David W. and Donald E. Greco.  “Notes on Church-State Affairs.”  Journal of 
Church and State 44, no. 1, Winter 2002.  Available at 
http://www3.baylor.edu/Church_State/journ2002Winter.html.  Accessed 1 May 
2006. 
95 
Hilarion, Alfayev, Russian Orthodox Church Bishop.  “Orthodoxy in a New Europe: 
Problems and Perspectives.” Religion in Eastern Europe XXIV, no. 3 (June 2004): 
18-26, http://www.georgefox.edu/academics/undergrad/departments/soc-
swk/ree/2004/hilarion.pdf, (accessed 1 June 2006). 
Horo  
y Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, 35-55.  Baltimore 
and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1994. 
Hyd Turn of the Millennium.”  In Beyond 
 
John Burbidge, 17-46.  New York and Brussels: Institute of Cultural Affairs 
Janji
w.kosovo.com/ckos/ckos06.jpg
witz, Donald L.  “Democracy in Divided Societies” in Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict,
and Democracy, edited b
en, Goran.  “Building Civil Society at the 
Prince and Merchant: Citizen Participation and the Rise of Civil Society, edited by
International, July 1997. 
ć, Sava, Rev.  Preface to Kosovo Crucified.  Prizen: Diocese of Raska and Prizen, 
2001, http://ww  (accessed 11 March 2006). 
.  New 
ress, 2000. 
be à la 
  Centre de Nouvelles ONU.  28 March 2005, 
http://www.un.org/apps/newsFr/storyF.asp?NewsID=10134&Cr=Kosovo&Cr1=MI
Judah, Tim.  The Serbs: History, Myth & the Destruction of Yugoslavia, 2d ed
Haven and London: Yale University P
“Kosovo: l’Envoyé de l’ONU Salue l’Accord de l’Eglise Orthodoxe Ser
Reconstruction des Sites Religieux.”
NUK (accessed 22 August 2005). 
Linz, Juan, and Alfred Stepan.  Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation.  
Marsh, Christopher, and Nikolas Gvosdev, eds., Civil Society and the Search for Justice 
in Russia.  Lexington Books, July 2002. 
Mylonas, Christos.  Serbian Orthodox Fundamentals: The Quest for an Eternal Identity.  
Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2003. 
New ritical 
Norris, Pippa, and Ronald Inglehart, Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics 
Worldwide.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
Norr  University Press, 2002. 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
ess in Meeting International Commitments 
since January 1998,” 20 May 1998, 
http://www.osce.org/documents/mc/1998/05/1047_en.pdf
Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1996. 
ton, Kenneth.  “Social and Political Trust in Established Democracies.”  In C
Citizens, edited by Pippa Norris, 169-187.  Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999. 
is, Pippa.  Democratic Phoenix.  New York: Cambridge
Europe.  “Report of the OSCE Mission to 
the Republic of Croatia on Croatia’s Progr





Peric, Tatjana.  “Relationship and Roles of the Roman Catholic Church in Croatia and
Serbian Orthodox Church in Ethnic Conflicts in Former Yugoslavia.”  Master’s 
thesis, Bossey Ecumenical Institute of the World Council of Churches.  Ge
Switzerland, 1996, 
swk/ree/PERIC2_YUG.html (accessed 1 June 2006). 
ca, Vjekoslav.  Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism inPeri  Yugoslav States.  New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2002. 
Poll
Polunov, Alexander.  “Social Programs of the Russian Orthodox Church: Prospects and 
is, Adamantia.  “Eastern Orthodoxy and Human Rights.”  Human Rights Quarterly 
15, no. 2 (May 1993): 339-357.  Available from JSTOR. 
Contradictions.”  School of Public Administration, Russia, 10 August 2005, 
http://www.spa.msu.ru/e-journal/8/81_1.php (Accessed 17 May 2006). 
Pond, Elizabeth.  “Kosovo and Serbia after the French Non.”  Washington Quarterly 2
no. 4 (Autumn 2005): 19-36.  Available from Proje
8, 
ct Muse. 
 no. 2 
Putn  introduction to Democracies in Flux: the 
Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary Society, edited by Robert D. Putnam, 
Ramet, Pedro.  “Factionalism in Church-State Interaction: the Croatian Catholic Church 
o Ramet, 181-
206.  Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1990. 
—— he 
 by Pedro Ramet, 232-248.  Durham and London: Duke 
University Press 1988. 
Ram ” In Serbia Since 1989: 
Politics and Society under Milošević and After, edited by Sabrina P. Ramet and 
s, 
——
niversity Press, 1998. 
Prodromou, Elizabeth.  “The Ambivalent Orthodox.” Journal of Democracy 15,
(April 2004): 62-75.  Available from Project Muse. 
am, Robert D. and Kristin A. Goss,
3-21.  New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. 
in the 1980s.” Slavic Review 44, no. 2 (Summer, 1985): 298-315.  Available from 
JSTOR. 
——.  “The Catholic Church in Yugoslavia, 1945-1989.”  In Catholicism and Politics in 
Communist Societies Christianity under Stress, vol. 2, edited by Pedr
.  “The Serbian Orthodox Church.” In Eastern Christianity and Politics in t
Twentieth Century edited
et, Sabrina P.  “The Politics of the Serbian Orthodox Church.
Vjeran Pavlaković, 255-285.  Seattle and London: University of Washington Pres
2005. 
.  Nihil Obstat: Religion, Politics, and Social Change in East-Central Europe and 
Russia.  Durham & London: Duke U
97 
—— bian National 
lities Papers 32 no. 4 
(December 2004): 765-779,  
/r/4
——.  Whose Democracy?  Nationalism, Religion, and the Doctrine of Collective Rights 
in Post-1989 Eastern Europe.  Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc., 1997. 
  “A Theory about the Causes of the Yugoslav Meltdown: The Ser
Awakening as a ‘Revitalization Movement.’”  Nationa
http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/media/78519up2yj3uqh4drlrl/contributions
/2/8/r428816047156188.pdf, (accessed 3 March 2006). 




Rémond, René.  Religion and Society in Modern Europe.  Oxford and Malden, 
Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, Inc., 1999. 
Riasanovsky, Nicholas V.  A History of Russia, 5th ed.  New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1993. 
Constantinople from the Eve of the Turkish Conquest to the Greek War of 
Independence.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 196
“Russia: Census and Religious Statistics.”  Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 3, no. 36 
September 2002), http://www.religioscope.com/note  
(accessed 9 October 2005). 
Sen,
w.wluml.org/english/newsfulltxt.shtml?cmd%5B157%5D=x-157-530529
 Amartya.  Identity and Violence: the Illusion of Destiny.  New York and London: 
W.W. Norton & Company, 2006. 
“Serbia and Montenegro: Ethnic Fundamentalism in Serbia.”  Women Living under 
Muslim Laws website, 17 March 2006, 
http://ww , 
(accessed 26 April 2006). 
Shla
http://www.msu.edu/%7Eshlapent/demography.htm
pentokh, Vladimir.  “The Reaction of the Russians to the Country’s Demographic 
Decline.”  (Michigan State University, n.d.), 
 (accessed 17 May 2006). 
Shla
sia List, 27 June 2005, 
http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/9186-29.cfm
pentokh, Vladimir.  “Trust in Public Institutions in Russia: The Lowest in the 
World.”  Johnson’s Rus
 (accessed 14 May 2006). 
Sieg
.  




el, Robert, Michele Norris, and Sylvia Poggioli. “Serbs Feel Punished in Post-
Yugoslavia World.”  National Public Radio: All Things Considered, 17 March 2006
Availa
Smock, David.  “Special Report no. 69: Catholic Contributions to International Peace.” 
United States Institutes for Peace.  (Washington, D.C., 9 Ap
 (accessed 12 May 2006). 
98 
Sowards, Steven W.  “Lecture no 5: The Serbian Revolution and the Serbian State.”  
page 
ied 23 April 2004, 
Snyder, Jack L.  From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict.  
New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2000. 
“Lecture No 5: The Serbian Revolution and the Serbian State,” Twenty-Five 
Lectures on Modern Balkan History (The Balkans in the Age of Nationalism), 
created May 1996, last modif
http://www.lib.msu.edu/sowards/balkan/ (accessed 1 March 2006). 
Sparks, Willis.  “The Faith of a President: Exploring the Religious Profile of Vladimir 
tin-faith.pdf
Putin.” Harriman Institute, February 2004, 
http://www.sipa.columbia.edu/REGIONAL/HI/Pu  (accessed 17 May 
2006). 
Spruyt, Hendrik.  The Sovereign State and its Competitors.  Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1994. 
Stee c Captive 
ealpolitik, edited by 
Douglas Johnston, 124-177.  Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. 
Štul
Longitudinalno Istraživanje Seksualnosti u Kasnoj 
Adolescenciji, 1998-2003.”  Sociological Review, no. 1-2. Croatian Sociological 
le, David A.  “Christianity in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo: From Ethni
to Reconciling Agent.”  In Faith-based Diplomacy: Trumping R
hofer, Aleksandar, Gordan Anterić, and Saša Šlosar.  “Seksualna Permisivnost, 
Egalitarnost I Odgovornost: 
Association, 21 October 2004, http://www.hsd.hr/revija/en/pdf/1-2-2004/03-
Stulhofer.pdf (accessed 3 May 2006). 
United States Institute of Peace: The Balkans Initiative.  “Rule of Law and Interreligious 
Cooperation.” (Washington, D.C, n.d.), http://www.usip.org/balkans/programs/
Tanner, Marcus.  Croatia: A Nation Forged in War.  New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1997. 
 
Unit
Balkans.” (Washington, D.C., n.d.), http://www.usip.org/balkans/grants.html
(accessed 28 April 2006). 
ed States Institutes for Peace: Balkans Initiative.  “USIP Grants Related to the 
 
U.S. nt and 
Future Status: Hearing before the Committee on International Relations. 109th 
U.S.  International Religious Freedom 2001. 
(Washington, D.C., December 2001), 
(accessed 18 May 2006). 
 Congress.  House.  Committee on International Relations.  Kosovo: Curre
Cong., 1st sess., 18 May 2005. 
 Department of State. Annual Report on




U.S. Department of State.  “Croatia.”  In Annual Report on International Religious 
Freedom 2004. (Washington, D.C., 15 September 2
 (accessed 2 May 2006). 
U.S. reedom  Department of State.  “Croatia.”  In Annual Report International Religious F
2005. (Washington, D.C., 8 November 2005), 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2005/51546.htm (accessed 16 February 2006). 
U.S. Department of State.  “Kosovo.”  In Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 
2005. Washington, D.C., 8 March 2006 http://pristina.usmission.gov/hrkos5.htm 
(accessed 18 May 2006). 
U.S. Department of State.  “Russia.” In Annual Report on International Religious 
Freedom 2002. (Washington, D.C., 7 October 2002), 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2002/13958.htm (accessed 13 May 2006). 
U.S. Department of State.  “Russia.” In Annual Report on International Religious 
Freedom 2005. (Washington, D.C., 8 November 2005), 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2005/51576.htm (accessed 23 March 2006). 
U.S. Department of State.  “Serbia and Montenegro (includes Kosovo).”  In International 
Religious Freedom Report 2005. (Washington, D.C., 8 November 2005), 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2005/51546.htm (accessed 23 April 2006). 




U.S. Library of Congress: Federal Research Division.  “Country Studies.” Washington, 
(accessed 25 February 2006). 
D.C., n.d., http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/ (accessed 1 May 2006). 
VanElderen, Marlin. “1999: The Year in Review.”  World Council of Churches, n.d.,   
http://www.wcc-coe.org/wcc/who/review-99.html (accessed 24 March 2006). 
Vars .  New 
ty Press, 2002. 
 
hney, Ashutosh.  Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India
Haven, CT: Yale Universi
“Visit to Zagreb, Croatia.”  Pax Christi International Newsletter, no. 19, March 1993, 
http://storage.paxchristi.net/NL19E93.pdf (accessed 12 May 2006). 
Walters, Philip.  “The Orthodox Church Seeks to Place Itself in Russian Society.” In 
nd 
sh, 83-90.  Brookline, Massachusetts: 
http://www3.baylor.edu/Church_State/orthodoxy1.html
Burden or Blessing?  Russian Orthodoxy and the Construction of Civil Society a
Democracy, edited by Christopher Mar
Institute on Culture, Religion and World Affairs Boston University, 2004, 
 (accessed 16 May 2006). 
100 
rthodoxy and the 
, 91-98.  
Brookline, Massachusetts: Institute on Culture, Religion and World Affairs Boston 
Warhola, James.  “Religiosity, Politics, and the Formation of Civil Society in 
Multinational Russia.”  In Burden or Blessing?  Russian O
Construction of Civil Society and Democracy, edited by Christopher Marsh
University, 2004, http://www3.baylor.edu/Church_State/orthodoxy1.html (accessed 
16 May 2006). 
Woehrel, Steven.  “CRS Report for Congress: Kosovo’s Future Status and U.S. Policy.”  
Wom rt Program & Network: Women’s Network Croatia.   
“Croatia Report on Women’s Human Rights in 2005,” March 2006, 
Congressional Research Service.  Washington, D.C., updated 9 January 2006. 




Yasmann, Victor.  “Russia: the Orthodox Church and the Kremlin's New Mission.”  
76-429f-802c-
RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, 10 April 2006, 
http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/04/9768f306-a0
07f591fc6417.html (accessed 17 May 2006). 
Zadrepko, Miroslav.  “Serbian Church Claims Victim Status.” Balkan Investigative 
Reporting Network: Balkan Insight, no. 17, 20 January 2006, 
http://www.birn.eu.com/insight_17_5_eng.php (accessed 24 April 2006). 
Zajovic, Stasa.  “Serbia and Montenegro: Religious Fundamentalism - the Birth Rate and 
Reproductive Rights.”  Women Living under Muslim Laws website, 17 July 2004, 
785http://www.wluml.org/english/newsfulltxt.shtml?cmd%5B157%5D=x-157-60  
http://www.ipsnews.co.th/anmviewer.asp?a=1396
(accessed 30 April 2006). 
Zimonjic, Vesna Peric.  “Religion-Serbia: Church Takes on a Sausage.”  Inter Press 
Service Asia Pacific, no. 41 (19 March 2004), cached text at 
 (accessed 27 April 2006). 









onal Defense University 
Washington, District of Columbia 
 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
3. Balkans Division 
Defense Intelligence Agency 
Bolling Air Force Base, Maryland 
 
4. Office of Research 
United States Department of State 
Washington, District of Columbia 
 
European Division 
Foreign Service Institute 
United States Department of State 
Arlington, Virginia 
6. Director of Intelligence  
Headquarters United States European Command 
Unit 30400 
APO AE 09131 
7. Director of Intelligence 
US Air Forces in Europe 
APO AE 09094-0120 
 
8. Dr Roy Stafford 
Nati
